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FEDERALISM GONE FAR ASTRAY FROM POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: THE ADMISSION OF
CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH BY STATE'S RULES-1990-2004

Dannye W. Holley
"Round up the Usual Suspects"
Claude Rains' Characterin "Casablanca"

I.

Introduction

This is a micro study of federalism in action. This
study identifies, ranks, and evaluates the current federal and
state rules regulating the same issue-whether to admit
prior convictions to impeach a witness and the appropriate
standards for doing so. Over the last several decades, there
has been an almost unanimous chorus of criticism
regarding the wholesale admission of convictions,
ostensibly only to impeach, especially when prosecutors are
authorized by an evidence rule to use convictions to
impeach the testimony of an accused in a criminal case.'
1Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with FederalRule of Evidence
609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence,
48 DRAKE L. REv. 1 (1999) (observing that the two decades since the
enactment of the federal rule proved its standards too liberally admitted
convictions to impeach-especially the accused); Richard D. Friedman,
CharacterImpeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and
a ProposedOverhaul, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 637, 638 (1991) (proposing
the abolition of all character impeachment evidence, including the use
of prior convictions to impeach, against the accused); Carl McGowan,
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants By PriorConvictions, 1 LAW &
THE SOC. ORD. 1, 2 (1970) (noting that English jurist characterized the
American practice of admitting convictions to impeach when the
accused who took the stand, and who had not sought to employ
character evidence to bolster his own credibility, as a "barbarous
custom"). Later, McGowan also notes that both the 1942 Model Code
of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted the view
of the English Jurist, banning the use of convictions to impeach the
accused, unless he had sought to bolster his own credibility. Id. at 5.
Since 1970, however, the Uniform Rules version of 609 has been
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Despite this criticism, this study, and a companion study of
how state supreme courts interpret these rules, provide a
basis for concluding that this admission avenue persists and
results in the admission of, in all probability, thousands of
convictions against hundreds of witnesses in the United
States each year.2
Because this is a study of an important set of
evidence rules-rules which provide detailed practice
guidelines that form the basis for regulating the crucial trial
issue of admissibility-initially one might expect that the
substantively amended twice; once to conform to the 1974 version of
the federal rule to encourage uniformity in federal and state courts, and
again in 1999 on the policy premise that twenty-five years of
experience demonstrated that the federal rule too liberally admitted
convictions against the accused and more generally because of its
failure to define the concepts of "dishonesty" and "false statement.").
See also Gene R. Nicol, Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal
Defendants: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
391 (1980) (arguing that the risk of denying the right to a fair trial is
sufficiently great so as to violate the federal right to due process);
Abraham D. Ordover, Balancing the Presumption of Guilt and
Innocence, Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 14041 (proposing an amendment to the federal rules which would require
judges to evaluate whether the effect on the jury of admitting prior
crime evidence would be its use for an impermissible prejudicial
purpose). According to H. Richard Uviller,
Character-an available index of propensity to fabricate
testimony-is a complex and dangerous area of evidence law....
This confusion in the application of law may reflect the fact that
we simply do not understand the role of character in predisposing
a witness to perjury and cannot recognize the conduct that
implies propensity to render truthful or untruthful testimony.
Masking our fundamental ignorance, we promulgate a set of
rules-applicable virtually at judicial whim--that neither
provides jurors with useful facts nor guarantees to shield
defendants from prejudicial inference. Simply put, the credibility
factor may be a wild card that could seriously undermine our
claims of faith in the adversary adjudicative system of justice.
H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character,And The Rule's of Evidence:
Seeing Through The Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 827 (1993).
2 Dannye Holley, Judicial Anarchy: The Admission of Convictions to
Impeach: State Supreme Court Interpretative Standards, 1990-2004
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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content of such rules would reflect jurisdiction-specific

concerns. This article examines if this expectation is
reality. The article then evaluates whether parochial
concerns justify this article's core finding that, at the end of
2004, there is more than one distinctive standard for every
two states regulating this very important issue. The first
purpose of this article is to report the results of the study of
the fifty states' rules and statutory standards regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach. This study evaluates
the current state standards using the federal rule and its
evolution as its focal point. The current federal rule is the
focal point for the identification and evaluation of the
standards in the states because, since its enactment in 1975,
most state rule makers have reviewed the federal rule and
the standards reflected during its evolution in considering
revision of their standard for admitting convictions to
impeach. 3
Part I of this article discusses in detail the original
standards of the federal rule and tracks the evolution of that
rule during the first three decades of its existence. 4 The
discussion includes the identification of the policy
decisions, and the lack thereof, reflected in the legislative
history leading to the enactment of the original 1975
federal rule, and the single subsequent substantive
amendment in 1990. This section also evaluates the United
rule. 5
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal
Part II of this article tracks the evolution during the
same three decades of changes in state evidence law to
determine the degree to which state statutes or rules
emulated the federal rule, as well as the degree to which
state evidence codes mimicked the 1990 amendment to the
federal rule. 6 As a result of this evaluation, this article
organizes the fifty states' standards into three categories:
3 See infra notes 10-21, 24-26 and accompanying
4 See infra notes 10-31 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes

text.

32-163 and accompanying text.
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(1) those identical to the federal rule; (2) those more
restrictively admitting convictions to impeach; and (3)
those more liberally admitting convictions to impeach.7
The bedrock finding of this study is that currently states use
twenty-eight different rules or statutory standards to
regulate the admission of convictions to impeach, and that
in forty-one states these standards are different,
sometimes
8
drastically different, than the federal rule.
The second purpose of this article, undertaken in the
third and final part, is to evaluate the merits of this large
array of rules regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. Achievement of this goal is premised first on the
acknowledgement that a bedrock virtue of federalism isexcept for those standards to which uniform adherence is
required by the national constitution, fifty-one legislatures
including the national Congress, or legislatively authorized
decision-makers-subject to each state's constitution to
resolve the same issue differently based on history, hunch,
policy, politics, or parochialism. This authority exists even
when, as is the case with regard to the issue of admitting
convictions to impeach, the federal standard was a known
and potentially unifying standard. In this final part, the
article evaluates whether it is "good federalism" when the
result of this freedom of choice is the existence of twentyeight different evidence standards with respect to the same
issue of admitting convictions to impeach a witness.
This final part of the article first identifies and
comments upon the most significant consequences of the
existence of so many standards and then focuses upon the
identification and evaluation of the plausible reasons for the
existence of so many state standards regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach. 9 Constitutional and
policy bases for evaluating the possible reasons for this
7 See
8

infra notes 39-40, 41-125, 126-163 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 41-163 and accompanying text.

9 See infra notes 164-232 and accompanying text.
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diversity of standards are identified and evaluated. The
article concludes with a recommendation that most states,
as well as the federal government, should and must modify
their current standard regulating the admission of
convictions to impeach.
II.

Federal Rule of Evidence 609: Enactment,
Official Commentary, and Evolution

When the federal rule regulating admission of
convictions to impeach was proposed, revised, and
finalized between 1969 and 1975, the national Congress
and most states permitted the use of prior convictions of
serious crimes, i.e., felonies, and misdemeanors involving0
dishonesty or false statements to impeach any witness.'
By the time the federal rule was considered, the Advisory
Committee noted that a modification to this standard,
which required trial judges to balance exclusionary policies
versus the probative value of the specific "felony" to prove
a propensity to lie, had been adopted by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals and had received a great deal
of scholarly and judicial attention." During points in the
10FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1972 Proposed
Rules. The advisory committee commentary noted that both the
Uniform Evidence and Model Evidence Rules only authorized the
admission of convictions for crimes involving "dishonesty or false
statement." The advisory committee acknowledged that the selection
of the standard expressed in the text was not the result of a policy
evaluation examining the merits of alternative standards, but rather a
decision to adopt current congressional policy as reflected in a District
of Columbia statute, in which Congress adopted this standard. For a
thorough review of the history of the enactment of the federal rule, see
Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 511-21 (1989).
11 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1972 Proposed
Rules. In Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the
court held that trial judges should balance the probative value of the
conviction with regard to credibility against the unfair prejudice it
Id. at 769. The decision allocated the burden of
would cause.
persuasion to the opponent of the conviction, most crucially the
accused, to prove that prejudice far outweighed probative value. Id.
The Luck court also identified guidelines that the trial judge should use
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enactment process, both houses of Congress adopted
standards that placed significantly greater restrictions on
the admission of convictions to impeach than even the
potential limits that would result from the balancing
12
standard of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
The initial House version of the rule banned use of
convictions to impeach any witness, except those for
crimes of dishonesty or false statements, and the original
Senate standard was almost as restrictive. 13 The Senate
amended its standard, however, reverting back to the liberal
majority admission standard of the times. The conference
committee ambiguously modified that standard, to require a
balancing evaluation when the conviction only qualified to
impeach because it was punishable by more than one year
in prison. 14 As the Advisory Committee recognized,
in conducting the balancing evaluation including the age of the
conviction, whether the conviction was relevant to prove dishonesty,
and whether it was for the same or similar crime as the crime for which
the accused is currently on trial. Id. The court also suggested that
when exclusionary concerns, such as similarity, were present the trial
judge should consider admitting only one conviction, or admitting such
a conviction only if it was strongly probative of dishonesty. Id. at 768,
n.8.
12 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's notes to 1974 enactment
of
the federal rule. Additionally, the judge who wrote the Luck opinion
sharply criticized the advisory committee's 1970 proposed draft, which
authorized the admission of convictions for all felonies and all crimes
of dishonesty or false statement. McGowan, supra note 1, at 7-13.
While acknowledging that the broad balancing approach he asserted in
Luck may not be the best approach, Judge McGowan noted that the
advisory committee's approach on the merits was far worse because it
was a potential violation of the most fundamental evidence principal
that only relevant evidence should be admitted on an issue. Id.
13 FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1974 enactment
of
the federal rule. The Senate standard, if the accused was the witness,
was the same as the House standard, but it also authorized the
admission of other convictions against other witnesses. To qualify
against such witnesses, a felony conviction had to undergo a balancing
evaluation that evenly weighted and pitted against each other relevance
to prove a propensity to lie versus the unfair prejudice that would result
if the conviction was admitted.
14 Id. The conference committee adopted a balancing scale that gave
the same weight to the results of a probative value to prove a propensity
to lie evaluation, and to an unfair prejudice evaluation, expressly pitting

6
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however, implicit in this compromise is the unproven
assumption that all records of convictions for crimes
than one year are relevant to prove a
punishable by more
5
lie.'
to
propensity
As a result of this course of adoption, the federal
rule that became effective in 1975 was so ambiguous,
courts and commentators contended that it established
either two or three standards to regulate the admission of
convictions to impeach. 16
The two standards interpretation read the rule to
authorize the per se admission of evidence of a conviction
for any "crime" of "dishonesty" or "false statement" to
impeach a witness. These standards also excluded all other
convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum term less
than one year in prison. The rule as enacted failed to
specifically define the concepts "crime," "dishonesty," or
"false statement."' 17 The second standard under the two
them against each other, and also expressly stating that the balancing
evaluation applied to the impeachment of any witness. In a nonsequential, subsequent paragraph, however, the advisory committee's
note asserted that the Conference Committee concluded that the
balancing protection was only warranted to protect the accused because
only then was it even arguable that unfair prejudice would be greater
than the loss of relevant evidence. The Conference Committee, without
evidence that it was conscious of this decision and without reference to
logic or empirical evidence to support its crucial assumption, decided
that every conviction for every crime punishable by more than one year
in jail was relevant to prove a propensity to lie. The Conference
Committee therefore concluded that the balancing evaluation need only
be undertaken when the witness was the accused or one of the
Inexplicably, however, the Conference
accused's witnesses.
Committee failed to use the word "accused" in the final version of the
rule it adopted, and the word that the committee used, "defendant," was
also not defined in the rule.
15See discussion infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
16FED. R. EvID. 609(a) (1975).
17Id.

In December 2006, the federal rule will be substantively
amended. The amended rule will limit the evaluation of whether the
underlying crime involved "dishonesty" or "false statement" to an
analysis of the elements of the crime as charged and tried. FED. R.
EVID. 609 (2006). The proponent of the conviction to impeach must
prove that establishing the elements of the crime required proof or
admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. Id.

7
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standards interpretation of the federal rule as enacted
authorized the admission of a conviction for a crime
punishable by more than one year in prison against any
witness, but only if the "crime"-perhaps also considering
the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
particular crime-made it relevant to prove a propensity to
lie, and then only if exclusionary
concerns did not outweigh
8
its probative value. 1
The three standards interpretation of the federal rule
as enacted split this second standard. The first sub-standard
was that any conviction for a crime punishable by more
than one year in prison was per se admissible to impeach
any witness, except criminal and civil defendants, or
alternatively only the accused, criminal case defendant, and
perhaps defense witnesses in a criminal case. 19 As to
defendants, or perhaps just the accused, and arguably his
witnesses, such convictions were only admissible when the
crime-or perhaps circumstances surrounding the
commission of the specific crime-made it relevant to a
prove propensity to lie, and then only if exclusionary
concerns did not outweigh its probative value.
These
differences in interpreting the enhanced federal rule were
caused by the fact that the standard concluded with a
specific reference to the "defendant"--a concept not
defined by the rule. Examined in context, the specific
reference to the defendant suggested only that category of
witnesses were protected by the sequential relevance and
exclusionary balancing evaluations. 2 '
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court resolved
the ambiguity in a five to three decision. The Court
18 Id. FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee's note to 1972 Proposed
Rules. The advisory committee noted that the rule adopted a functional
definition of serious crime based on congressional views of what was a
serious crime, rather than using the term "felony," which the committee
noted was defined differently in various states.
19 FED.

20

id.

21

id.

R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (1975).
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adopted the most liberal admission of the three standards
view of the enacted federal rule's regulation of convictions
to impeach-limiting the balancing evaluation protection to
only the accused, and perhaps witnesses of the accused.22
In adopting the three standards interpretation, the Court
placed the most emphasis on its review and evaluation of
the five year legislative history of the rule. The Court
concluded that the majority standard in state and federal
practice prior to 1969 was even more liberal in admitting
convictions to impeach.23
Just one year later, however, Congress modified the
Court's interpretation of the rule.24 Although the Court's
interpretation was modified, the amended rule retained a
three standards approach. The amended rule kept what this
article has referred to as standard one, shared by both
interpretations of the enacted rule, which per se admitted
convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement"
to impeach any witness. The amended rule also retained
the Court's second standard which provided more
protection to the accused and arguably his witnesses by
imposing the equally weighted balancing evaluation before
admitting convictions to impeach solely because the
underlying crime was punishable by more than a year in
prison. The amendment changed the third standard as
The amendment
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
admission for
towards
tilted
adopted a balancing evaluation
all other witnesses when the sole basis for offering the
conviction to impeach was the fact that the underlying
crime was punishable by more than a year in prison. 2 This
Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Id. at 530-35 (Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan J.J.,
dissenting).
21Id. at 511-24.
24
FED. R. EvID. 609 (1990).
25 Id. But see Uviller, supra note 1, at 817 (surveying federal trial
judges and concluding that the "apparent textual difference" with
regard to the specific balancing standard for the accused in Rule 609
and the Rule 403 balancing standard for all other witnesses does not
22

9
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revised third standard expressly incorporated by reference
the overall generic admissibility balancing standard of the
evidence rules, which requires a finding that the injury to
enumerated exclusionary policies,
including unfair
prejudice, does not substantially outweigh the probative
2
value of the proffered evidence. V
Several
perspectives
should
be
identified
concerning the federal rule regulating the admission of
convictions to impeach, including its enactment history and
content before tracking the standards maintained, enacted,
and revised by the state legislatures and supreme courts
since 1975. First, Federal Rule of Evidence 609, as revised
in 1990, is still the current three standards scheme for
regulating the admission of convictions to impeach in
27
federal court.
establish a meaningful difference in the evaluation of admissibility of a
P6rior conviction as proof of a propensity to lie as perceived or applied).
FED. R. EvID. 609. In the federal rules, and in many state evidence
rules, the generic policy-balancing rule is numbered 403. See, e.g.,
FED. R. EvID. 403.
27 But see discussion of the first substantive amendment of
the
standards since 1990, effective December 2006, supra note 17. As
enacted and retained to date, the federal rule included four additional
subordinate admission guidelines that come into play once a conviction
first qualifies under one of the three basic admission standards. First,
the rule excludes otherwise qualified convictions when there is a form
of official recognition of rehabilitation provided the accused was not
subsequently convicted of a felony, or there was a form of official
recognition that in fact the accused was innocent of the crime for which
he was convicted. FED. R. EvID. 609(c). Second, the rule excludes
otherwise qualified convictions if they are in fact juvenile
adjudications, unless the constitution mandates their admission. FED.
R. EvID. 609(d). Third, the rule presumptively excludes otherwise
qualified convictions which were entered ten years prior to the current
trial if no jail time was imposed, or ten years after release if jail time
was imposed. The proponent can overcome this presumption only if he
gives notice and shows that, in the interest of justice, the probative
value of such an old conviction substantially outweighs its prejudice
based on specific facts and circumstances. FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
Finally, the rule provides that the pendency of an appeal does not bar
the use of an otherwise qualified conviction, but the fact that the appeal
is pending is also admissible. FED. R. EVID. 609(e).
The rule has never addressed two important related procedural
issues. First, it does not address the issue of whether the opponent of

10
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Second, the legislative history of the rule, at least by
implication, acknowledged that its significance depended
upon the liberality of the rule admitting convictions
substantively. 28
Third, inexplicably, with regard to the per se
admission standard, the federal rule drafters and reviewers
have never seen fit either to define "dishonesty" or "false
statement," as those two terms are used in Federal Rule of
Evidence 609, or to explain why they employed two terms
rather than employing a single concept. This omission has
endured despite the fact that the congressional Conference
Committee in finalizing the rule expressly stated a more
precise set of qualifying criteria when it identified, by
crime example and residuary language, an intent to limit
the admission of such a conviction, especially the accused, must testify
at trial to preserve his right to appeal a decision to admit a conviction to
impeach. A majority of states authorize the use of a motion in limine
or comparable pre-trial hearing procedure to test the admissibility of a
conviction to impeach prior to trial, in order to facilitate sound trial
strategic decisions including which key witnesses, especially the
accused, will testify at trial. In United States v. Luce, 469 U.S. 38
(1984), the Supreme Court placed the federal legal system in the
minority of state systems by holding that an accused could not appeal
the denial of a motion in limine which sought to exclude admission of a
prior conviction to impeach, unless the accused takes the stand and is
impeached with that conviction. This decision enhanced that the
likelihood the accused will choose not to testify. In 1999, however, the
federal rules of evidence were amended (specifically FED. R. EVID.
103) making it clear that the loser of a properly preserved pre-trial
evidentiary ruling need not revisit that issue during trial in order to
preserve the right to appeal the pre-trial ruling. The advisory
committee's note to the amendment, however, claimed that it was not
an attempt to codify or overrule Luce. Second, when a conviction is
admitted to impeach, the opponent is entitled in most jurisdictions to an
immediate limiting instruction-the jury must be told that the
conviction cannot be used to decide the merits of the case.
28 During its consideration of the rule in 1970, the Senate made specific
reference to the companion substantive rule (FED. R. EVID. 404) and the
possibility that a conviction could be admitted to convict in a criminal
case if it qualified under the exceptions to the nonnal substantive
exclusionary principle. The Senate also referred to the possibility of
admitting a conviction for specific impeachment purposes when a
witness "opened the door" by denying the existence of such a
conviction.

11
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per se admission to a narrow range of crimes whose
elements made the conduct-if not the record of

conviction-relevant to prove a propensity to lie. 29 The
committee identified specific offenses satisfying the
definitions including: perjury, subordination of perjury,
false pretense, false statement, fraud, embezzlement, and
other crimes the commission of which per se involves
crimen falsi-the 30accused engaged in an untruth, a
falsehood, or deceit.
Fourth, and most importantly to this study of
federalism, the federal standard has been the only pervasive
benchmark referred to by state lawmakers in considering or
reconsidering the appropriate standard to adopt since
1975. 3 1 The next section of this article reports on what the
state rule makers have decided, bearing in mind, that each
state had the option of retaining their pre-1975 rule, or
adopting, modifying, or rejecting each of the three federal
rule standards for admitting convictions to impeach.

FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory committee's note to 1974 enactment of
the federal rule. But see discussion of the December 2006 amendment
of this standard supra note 17. This amendment is designed to finally
rovide textual recognition of the advisory committee's position.
Id.
31 Evidence authorities have asserted that as many as forty-three states
29

have modeled their evidence rules after the federal rules. Preface to
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (NUTSHELL)

(West 2003). Numerical evidence that the federal evidence rules, and
at least its numbering of the federal rule regulating the admission of
convictions to impeach, is illustrated by the fact that twenty-seven of
the thirty-one states with the same substantive standard, or with a more
restrictive standard, have numbered their rule regulating this issue with
an identical or a very similar number. See infra notes 39, 41.

12
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IlI.

State Evidence Rules Regulating the
Admission of Convictions To Impeach-A
Conceptual Ranking of the Liberality of
Their Admission Standard(s) Organized in
Three Categories Based on Whether the
States' Standard(s) are Identical To, More
Restrictive, or More Liberal Than the
Standards of the Federal Rule
A. The Premises and the Bases for the
Premises for Ranking the State Rules

In this section the fifty states' standards are
organized into three categories: (1) those identical to the
federal rule; (2) those more restrictively admitting
convictions to impeach; and (3) those more liberally
admitting convictions to impeach. Within the latter two
categories-in order to accurately present the full
magnitude of the diversity of the states' rules regulating the
admission of convictions to impeach-the article groups
similar, more liberal, or more restrictive state rules and
discusses them sequentially beginning with the most liberal
and most restrictive state rules, and ending with the states
whose standards are only slightly more restrictive or more
liberal than the federal rule.
The primary premise for ranking rules on the
continuum from most restrictive to most liberal with regard
to admission of convictions to impeach is the quantity of
convictions they authorize for automatic admission. In
identifying the quantity of convictions, this article
recognizes that the rules most often make reference to
broad crime categories in authorizing automatic admission
of convictions to impeach, and that overall data is available
only to determine the quantity of convictions by relatively
broad crime categories rather than by individual crime.
What we do know, for example, is that several state rules
do automatically authorize admission to impeach with

13
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convictions for "felonies," a broad category of crimes most
frequently defined as those crimes punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year. We also know that
state courts collectively convict approximately one million
persons each year of such offenses. 2
Second, this article employs the following
assumption about one of the most frequent categories of
convictions-those involving crimes of "dishonesty" or
"false statement" for which many state rules authorize
automatic admission to impeach. Many of the state rules,
following the pattern in the federal rule described in Part I,
authorize such admission, without defining "dishonesty" or
"false statement."
In ranking the state rules, it was
necessary to provide a definition for these concepts in order
to quantify the number of convictions which automatically
be admitted to impeach any witness. The most appropriate
definition is found in the official commentary and
In 2002, the most recent year for which national data is available,
state courts convicted about 1,051,000 adults of a felony. Although
each state's definition of the term felony varies, most states define it as
a crime punishable by a minimum term of more than one year in prison.
This is the same way that felony is defined in Federal Rules of
Evidence in determining what types of convictions can be used to
impeach a witness. In 2000, state courts convicted an estimated
924,700 adults of a felony. In 1998, state courts convicted an estimated
930,000 adults of a felony. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice
Program, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletins, Felony Sentences in
State Courts (2000, 2002, 2004). Every two years, the federal Bureau
of Justice Statistics conducts a survey of state "felony" convictions.
The survey also reports the number of felony convictions in the federal
system for that same year. In conducting the survey, however, the OJS
does not require or even suggest that the sampled state counties adhere
to a uniform definition of the word "felony" in reporting their data.
There is some variation on how that term is defined in the states. See
infra note 82 and accompanying text. At the end of 2004, there was
still no systematic collecting and reporting of the number of
convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment
of less than one year, although the National Center for State Courts has
begun a project to collect such data, which they hope to report
sometime in 2005. Based on data from individual states, the number of
convictions, if not the number of adults convicted for such offenses, is
at least two and one-half to three times as great as the number of
"felony" convictions.
32
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legislative history of the federal rule. 33 Based on this
definition, at most, ten percent of all convictions for crimes
punishable by any term of imprisonment are properly
as involving "false statements" or
characterized
"dishonesty."
The third, and sequential, premise for ranking
states' rules on a continuum from most restrictive to most
liberal is the quantity of convictions they authorize for
possible discretionary admission, and the degree to which
the rule standards tilt the exercise of that discretion towards
admission. A state rule could employ one of three
progressively more restrictive balancing standards, pitting
exclusionary policies, especially unfair prejudice, against
the relevance of the conviction to prove a propensity to
Of course, convictions, which under a state's
lie. 34
standards do not qualify for either automatic or
discretionary admission are subject to per se exclusion, and
the evaluation scheme also must account for the percentage
of convictions in a given state that are in this third category.
The scheme must assign weight to the significance of the
automatic admission and exclusion categories as well as to
the three incremental discretionary admission standards.
The automatic categories were given more weight because
such rules eliminate the exercise of judicial discretion in
most states. Further support for this weighting decision
comes from the study of state supreme court cases for this
same fifteen year period.
The next major premise for ranking states' rules on
the continuum from most restrictive to most liberal is that
the standards for admitting convictions to impeach the
accused are as important as the standards regulating the
33 See supranotes 29-30 and accompanying text.
34 The federal rule employs both the discretionary standard tilted

towards admission and the neutral standard. See supra notes 20, 25-26
and accompanying text. For an analysis of state rules that employ the
discretionary standard tilted towards exclusion, see infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
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admission of convictions to impeach all other witnesses,

and therefore both categories of witnesses were given
independent and equal weight in determining the degree of
liberality of each state's rule. The basis of this premise is
that during the period of this study the substantial majority
of state supreme courts' decisions on this issue involved the
propriety of admitting convictions to impeach the
accused.35 In addition, empirical research findings include
those in which the verdicts of "jurors" and "juries" were
significantly influenced by the admission of convictions to
impeach the accused, as well as findings that the influence
on jurors was greater when convictions were admitted
against the accused as compared to other types of witnesses
including civil parties. 36 As already discussed, the federal
rule and a majority of state rules, reflect the rule makers'
decision to consider the admission of convictions to
impeach the accused separately from the standards for other
witnesses. 37

The final related, but less significant premise, is that
impeachment rules are specifically applicable only to the
parties to civil litigation, and are as important as those rules
that regulate the examination of non-party witnesses in civil
and criminal cases. Therefore, when a state rule has a
different standard for civil parties than for non-parties, the
two sets of rules are given equal weight in determining the
degree of liberality of each state's rule in admitting
convictions to impeach. The basis of this premise is
twofold. First, cases such as Green, demonstrate the grave
35 See Holley, supra note 2.
36 For a study usually referred to as the most comprehensive study of

the effect of the admission of convictions on actual juries, see HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, (Little Brown

1966) (reviewing study of the performance of actual juries and
concluding that the introduction of an accused's prior record for any
purpose increased the likelihood of conviction by 27%). For a
discussion of other studies reaching similar conclusions, see infra notes
209-18 and accompanying text.
37 See supra notes 20, 25 and accompanying text; infra notes 39, 44, 52,
59, 70, 102, 105-07, 161 and accompanying text.
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consequences that can result when convictions are admitted
to impeach the testimony of a party witness. Second,
empirical research reveals that when convictions are
admitted against civil parties, as compared to non-party
witnesses, there is a greater likelihood the outcome will be
influenced.38
See discussion of Green, supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
With regard to empirical evidence, see infra notes 209-18 and
accompanying text. Mississippi, infra note 123, is the only state which
in fact has a completely separate standard for civil parties, but
Louisiana, infra note 137, has a separate rule for all civil witnesses
including the parties, in comparison to the rule for all criminal
witnesses including the accused. In addition, Virginia, infra note 154,
has by court decision applied its criminal trial standard for admitting
convictions only to civil party witnesses. When these premises are
taken together they produce an evaluation scheme that could be
represented by the following "scale":
38

Conceptual Outline - Chart-Numerical Format
Justifying The Heirarchy and the Respective Rankings
MOST POINTS = MOST RESTRICTIVE
Cvs of crimes for which max penalty
Cvs of crimes for which max penalty
is more than one year
is less than one ear
Note: Assumption crimes of "Dishonesty or False Statement"
10% or less of all convictions in both of above categories

Auto
Admit
1

2

Auto
Exclude
3

Auto
Admit
4

5

Balancing

Balancing
abc
Point allocation for each of above 10 categories
0
1
16
10
168
0
FRE Score = 41.4
0(10%)
FRE Acc"
0(10%)
FRE AOW"

Auto
Exclude
6

14.4 (90%)
14.4 (90%)

abc

168

0 (10%)
0 (10%)

10

16

7.2 (90%)
5.4 (90%)
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The next subsection identifies the states whose
current rules mimic the federal rule. This subsection is
followed by the ranking of states which more restrictively
admit convictions to impeach than the federal rule, and a
subsection ranking the states which more liberally admit
convictions to impeach than the federal rule.
B. States with Rules That Employ the Same
Standard as the Federal Rule's Standard
for Admitting Convictions to Impeach
By 2004, nine of the fifty states by rule admitted
convictions to impeach using the same three standards as
the federal rule. 39 The rules in most of these states reflect
State Scores
Mont. = 64

W. Va. = 51.6

Ark., Del., Minn.,
& Wash. = 43.2

Va. = 28

Miss. = 42.3
I11.= 42
FRE = 41.4

Or. = 27.2/28
R.I. & Wis. = 24
La. = 14.6

Pa. = 57.6
Mich. = 56.65

Vt. = 50.6
Idaho = 48
Ariz., Me., Md.,
S.D., & Tex = 46.2
Conn. = 46
Ga. = 44.8

N.J. = 12
N.C. = 9.6

Ind. = 52.4

Tenn. = 44.2

N.H. = 36
Ca., Colo., Ky.,
& Nev. = 32
Fla. & Neb. =
28.8

Haw. 62
Alaska = 60.8
Kan. = 60.8

Mass., Mo., &
N.Y. = 0

39 ALA. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (adopted effective January 1, 1996); IOWA
R. EvID. 609 (2004) (using the same definition of "felony" after

substantive amendments in 1996 aligned it with the definition used in
the post 1990 federal rule); N.M. R. EvID. 11-609 (2004) (emulating the
federal rule amendment pattern by revision in 1991 to reflect 1990
amendment of FED. R. EVID. 609(a)); N.D. R. EVID. 609 (2004)
(originally modeled after 1974 version of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, but with subsequent amendments this amendment
substantively tracks the 1990 amendment of federal rule); OHIO R.
EvID. 609 (2004) (enacted in 1980, amended in 1991, the effect of
which was to make the state rule, for the first time, identical to the
federal rule); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2609 (2004) (original rule
effective in 1978, and amended effective 1991); S.C. R. EvID. 609
(2004) (enacted and effective in 1995); UTAH R. EVID. 609 (2004)
(enacted in 1980); WYO. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (requiring a 403
balancing evaluation for witnesses other than the accused with the
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an enactment process that closely compared the states'
rules to the federal rule, and were either enacted after 1991
or amended during the 1990s to track the amendment to the
federal rule following the Supreme Court's decision in
Green.40 Like the federal rule they mirror, these rules
originally failed to define and continue to fail to define
which crimes involve "dishonesty" and "false statement."
C. States With More Restrictive Rules
Regarding Admission of Convictions to
Impeach Than FED. R. EvID. 609

By 2004, twenty-four of the fifty states by rule,
statute, court decision, or a combination thereof placed

greater overall restrictions than the federal rule on the
admission of convictions to impeach. 4 1 The rules of these
substantive amendment effective in 1992).
40 ALA. R. EvID. 609 (2004); IOWA R. EvID. 609 (2004) (defining
"felony" in the same way as the federal rule); N.M. R. EVID. 11-609
(2004) (enacted in 1976, and emulating the FED. R. EvID. amendment
pattern by revision in 1991 to reflect the 1990 amendment of the
federal standard); N.D. R. EviD. 609 (2004); OHIO R. EVID. 609 (2004)
(enacted in 1980 and requiring even balancing of probative value for
lying against unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury if the witness is the accused in a criminal case. The original
1980 rule did not include a balancing reference because the Staff Notes
asserted that the federal rule at that time could be interpreted to require
policy evaluation for only the defendant in a criminal case. The intent
was to make the admission more restrictive by requiring a Rule 403
balancing analysis with regard to all witnesses.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
2609 (2004) (original rule effective in 1978. The 1991 amendment
aligned the Ohio rule with the 1990 change in the federal rule to require
balancing for all witnesses except the accused); UTAH R. EvID. 609
(2004) (amended in 1992 to tract the 1990 amendment to the federal
rule); WYO. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (employing identical language as the
federal rule, and a key substantive amendment with regard to requiring
a standard of balancing for witnesses in civil cases was added around
1992 which resulted in the Wyoming rule constituting the same
standard as the post-1990 federal rule).
41 ALASKA R. EVID. 609 (2004) (effective 1979, amended effective
1994); ARIZ. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (originally enacted in the mid-1970s);
ARK. R. EvID. 609 (2004); CONN. R. EvID. § 6-7 (2003) (enacted after
1995); DEL. CODE ANN., UNIFORM R. EvID. 609 (2004) (enacted in
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twenty-four states employ seventeen distinct standards. In

the following discussion, similar, more restrictive state
rules will be grouped and discussed sequentially beginning
with the most restrictive rules, and proceeding to the states'
rules whose standards are only slightly more restrictive
than the federal rule.
States which by rule impose greater restrictions than
the federal rule on the admission of convictions to impeach
include Montana, which bans the use of convictions to
impeach. 42
This blanket prohibition of the use of
convictions to impeach was based on several policy
reasons. The most important of these reasons to the
drafters of the Montana rule was their evaluation that the
mere existence of a conviction has low probative value to
prove a propensity to lie, and in those instances where
conduct underlying the conviction is probative of lying,

1980); GA. STAT. ANN.

§§ 24-9-20, 24-9-84 (2004) (combining

substance of FED. R. EVID. 608 and 609); HAWAII R. EvID. 609 (2004)
(effective 1981); IDAHO R. EvID. 609 (2004) (rule adopted and became
effective in 1985 and the amended rule became effective in 1998); IND.
STAT. REv. R. 609(a) (2004) (enacted in 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN., §
60-421 (2004) (effective 1964); ME. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (amended
effective 1978, 1985, 1990, and 1992); MD. R. EvID. 5-609 (2004)
(adopted 1994) (overriding the conflicting statutory provision contained
in MD. CODE ANN. § 10-905); MICH. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (enacted in
1978, and amendments effective in 1980 and 1988); MINN. R. EVID.
609 (2004) (enacted between 1978 and 1980); MISS. R. EvID. 609
(2004) (as amended in 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-6, Rule 609
(2004) (originally effective in July 1, 1977, and then amended by
Supreme Court Order on June 7, 1990); PA. R. EvID. 609 (2004)
(effective 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-12, Rule 609 (2004)

(effective date around 1980); TENN. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (effective
1990); TEX. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (effective 1998); VT. R. EVID. 609
(2004) (current restrictive substantive form of the rule, as discussed
infra notes 74-80, is the result of an amendment in 1989. The
amendment eliminated the historical standard of qualifying convictions
to impeach because they qualified as crimes of "moral turpitude.");
WASH. R. EVID. 609 (2004) (originally effective in 1979, and 1988
amendment requires a balancing evaluation for all witnesses, not just
the accused, in a criminal case); W. VA. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (effective
1985); People v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. 1971).
42 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-6, Rule 609 (2004).

20

2:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY

259

another evidence rule allowed admission of such conduct.4 3
43 Mont. Code Ann. § 26-10-6, Rule 609 (2004) cmt. The Montana
Evidence Commission Comments following the rule stated:

This rule is unlike either the FED. R. EVID. 609 or Uniform Rules
of Evidence Rule 609 in that they both provide that evidence of
conviction of a crime is admissible for the purpose of attacking
credibility. However, both rules place substantial limitations
upon the admissibility of this type of evidence including: (a) the
discretion of the court; (b) a time limit; and (c) a pardon,
annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation making such evidence
inadmissible.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a), (b), (c); UNIFORM R. EvID. 609(a), (b), (c)

(1974). The latter subdivision also provides an "other equivalent
procedure" and makes conviction inadmissible; while Montana does
not have a certificate of rehabilitation, MONT. CONST. art. II § 28;
Section 95-2227(3), R.C.M. 1947 46-18-801. However, both provide
that when a person is no longer under state supervision, his full rights
of citizenship are restored. Adoption of this provision would mean that
only those persons serving a sentence in prison, serving a suspended
sentence, or on parole could be impeached by this method, which
would severely limit the usefulness of the rule.
The Commission rejected the rule allowing impeachment by
evidence of conviction of a crime, not only because of these
Constitutional and statutory provisions, but also, and most importantly
because of its low probative value in relation to credibility. The
advisory committee does not accept as valid the theory that a person's
willingness to break the law can automatically be translated into a
willingness to give false testimony. FED. R. EvID. 609, advisory
committee's note to 1969 Proposed Rule). The advisory committee
believed that being convicted of a certain crime is probative of a
person's credibility; however, the committee believed that the specific
act of misconduct underlying the person's conviction is relevant, not
whether his or her conduct has led to a conviction. Allowing the
admission of a conviction for impeachment purposes merely because it
is a convenient method of proving the act of misconduct is not
acceptable to the advisory committee, particularly in light of FED. R.
EVID. 608(b), which admits acts of misconduct if they relate to
credibility. Furthermore, the advisory committee felt that, in addition
to the reasons for rejecting the rule stated above, the present Montana
practice could lead to one of two undesirable results. First, the mere
fact that a witness can be asked whether he has been convicted of a
felony can, in many instances, cause severe embarrassment to the
witness. This is particularly uncalled for where the conviction has no
relation to credibility, such as manslaughter caused by an automobile
accident. This could cause many witnesses to decide not to testify at all
or, when the witness is a party, not to present or defend his side of the
case at all. The fact that the witness can explain his conviction can
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Hawaii has the second most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule.
The Hawaii rule
establishes two standards, one limits admission to only
convictions of crimes involving "dishonesty" for all
witnesses except the accused, and the other bans the use of
convictions to impeach the accused, unless she first offers
evidence to bolster her own credibility.44 "Dishonesty" is
not defined in the Hawaii Rule.45
This standard therefore protects all witnesses,
including the accused, to a much greater extent than the
federal rule. First, it removes the discretion afforded to
judges to balance the unfair prejudice against the probative
value of a conviction as proof of a propensity to lie based
solely on the hunch that a maximum punishment of over a
year for that offense per se means that such a conviction is
minimally relevant on this issue. In effect, Hawaii has
limited the admissibility of convictions to impeach by rule,
except for the accused, to only a portion of those
convictions that are automatically admitted against all
witnesses under the federal rule. The reasons for adopting
this significantly more restrictive approach include
references to state constitutional provisions and
simply add to the embarrassment and is not helpful. Second, when the
witness answers that he has been convicted of a crime, no further
inquiry is permitted. This can lead to confusion by jury members who
see no connection between the conviction of a crime and the case or to
undue prejudice, particularly when the witness is a defendant testifying
on his own behalf. Id.
44 HAWAHI R. EvID. 609 (2004).
45 HAWAII R. EVID. 609 cmt. (asserting that rule is meant to encompass
crimes involving false statement and giving "perjury" as a specific
example of such a crime). Like the federal rule, this is another instance
in which the drafters of the Hawaii rule would have done a better job if
they had either defined a crucial concept in the rule, here "dishonesty,"
in accord with their commentary, or eliminated the concept completely.
If the drafters eliminated the concept and simply inserted one concrete
qualifying crime in the rule or simply added the language "and other
crimes whose elements require proof of a false statement," the rule
would provide guidance to which crimes come within the scope of the

rule.
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interpretations thereof which have resulted in banning the
use of prior convictions to impeach the accused.4 6 Even
more significantly, one of the reasons given for the broader
exclusionary rule, which makes the rule even more
exclusionary than it appears on its face, is the policy
finding that the mandatory admission of any conviction is
wrong because it displaces, without adequate policy
justification, the pervasively applicable evidence policy
balancing rule-Federal Rule of Evidence 403-and its
state equivalents.47 The commentary explains that the rule
was drafted with the intent that when convictions for
crimes of "dishonesty" were offered to impeach witnesses
other than the accused, they should only be admitted if their
probative value as proof of a propensity to lie was not
exclusionary policy concerns,
substantially outweighed by
48
including unfair prejudice.
Alaska has the third most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
This rule limits
restrictively than the federal rule.
admissibility to convictions of crimes which involve
"dishonesty" or "false statement" for all witnesses, but only
if the probative value of such convictions to prove a
propensity to lie outweighs the prejudicial effect. 49 The
Alaska rule is therefore, in contrast to the federal and most
state rules, a single standard rule. In contrast to the federal
rule, the Alaska rule eliminates the admission of
convictions based solely on the maximum sentence
proscribed for the underlying crime, as well as differential
and
treatment of the accused. Crimes of "dishonesty"
50
"false statement" are not defined in the Alaska rule.
Kansas has the fourth most restrictive rule. This
rule limits admissibility to convictions involving
46 id.

47 id.
48 id.
49

ALASKA

50

Id.

R. EVID.

609 (2004).
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"dishonesty" or "false statement" to impeach all witnesses
except the accused, but requires the automatic admission of
such convictions without consideration of prejudice and
other exclusionary policies. 5 1 The Kansas rule adopts a
two standards approach, eliminating the federal rule's
authorization of the potential admission of convictions to
impeach based solely on the fact that the maximum
sentence authorized for the underlying crime was for more
than one year. This rule mirrors the focus of the federal
rule's first standard of admission, but excludes the accused.
Overall, the Kansas rule is a hybrid of the Hawaii and
Alaska standards. It is less restrictive than the Alaska
standard because it does not require consideration of
exclusionary concerns before any crime deemed to be one
involving dishonesty or false statement can be admitted to
impeach a witness other than the accused. With regard to
the accused, this standard employs the same standard as
that of Hawaii-banning use of convictions to impeach
unless the accused first introduces 52evidence for the sole
purpose of bolstering his credibility.
The Kansas standard restricts the use of convictions
to impeach one class of witnesses-the accused-more
than the Alaska standard, but more liberally admits
convictions to impeach all other witnesses than the Alaska
standard. It is ranked fourth despite the fact it received the
same "score" as Alaska because, while protection of the
accused is co-equal with the need to protect the aggregate
of all other witnesses for the purposes of this article, the
Alaska standard is comparatively more protective of the
53
accused than the Kansas statute is of all other witnesses.
The Kansas rule also fails to define "dishonesty" or "false
statement."
51KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (2004).
52

id.

53 For a discussion of the basis for the co-equal "ranking" of the

accused with all other witnesses, see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania has the fifth most restrictive rule.
This rule limits admissibility for all witnesses to only those
convictions which are for crimes that involve "dishonesty"
and "false statement" and does not have an express
The
exception in the text of the rule for the accused.
Pennsylvania standard is more restrictive than the federal
rule because it eliminates the admission of convictions to
impeach for all witnesses based solely on the maximum
length of potential punishment for the crime. However, the
rule is more liberal than some component of the preceeding
four state standards because it admits all convictions for
crimes of "dishonesty" and "false statement" against all
witnesses without a balancing evaluation. 55 As such, the
Pennsylvania rule is like the Alaska rule because it adopts a
single standard of admissibility for all witnesses. In fact, it
is almost identical to that Alaska standard except it
eliminates the protection provided by the balancing of
exclusionary policy concerns against the probative value
for impeachment purposes of a conviction for a crime
The
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement."
crimes
which
define
Pennsylvania rule also does not
56
involve "dishonesty" and "false statement.'
Michigan has the sixth most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. This rule applies to all
witnesses, including the accused and is like the federal rule
because it authorizes the per se admission of convictions
for crimes which contain an element of "dishonesty" or
"false statement." The Michigan rule, however, is more
restrictive than the federal rule because it only authorizes
the admission of felony convictions, which have a theft
14 PA. R. EvID. 609 (2004) (making a cross-reference to a statute which
prohibited the use of otherwise qualified convictions to impeach the
accused in a criminal case during cross-examination, but authorized
during rebuttal).
admission
55

56

id.

The official commentary to the rule does not define these concepts.
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element for all witnesses other than the accused.57 With
regard to these theft felonies, a Michigan judge is only
authorized to admit such a crime to impeach if she finds
"significant" probative value on the issue of credibility, but
she does not then have to evaluate whether that probative
value outweighs unfair prejudice or other exclusionary
policies. 58 With regard to the accused, the Michigan rule
restricts the admission of felony theft convictions to
impeach to those that not only satisfy the "significant"
probative value to prove a propensity to lie requirement,
but also requires that once that level of probative value is
found by the trial judge, she must then determine that the
probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect that will
result from its admission.59 Michigan is one of the few
states whose rule includes express guidelines for60 how to
evaluate "probative value" and "unfair prejudice.'
The Michigan rule, like the federal rule, adopts a
three standards basis for considering the admission of
convictions to impeach, but is more restrictive than the
federal rule with regard to the standards authorizing the
admission of convictions based in whole or in part on the
maximum punishment for the crime. Michigan is also the
first state in this discussion of progressively less restrictive
rules to potentially admit convictions to impeach against all
kinds of witnesses based on a particular crime (felony theft)
which is not within the rule's definition of "dishonesty" or
"false statement." Although the Michigan rule does not
define which crimes involve "dishonesty" or "false
57 MICH.
58 Id.

R. EVID. 609 (2004).

59 Id.
60

MICH. R. EvID. 609(b) ("The court shall consider only the age of the

conviction and the degree to which a conviction of the crime is
indicative of veracity. If a determination of prejudicial effect is
required, the court shall consider only the conviction's similarity to the
charged offense and the possible effects on the decisional process, if
admitting the evidence causes the defendant to elect not to testify. The
court must articulate on the record, the analysis of each factor.")
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statement," by logical implication the rule takes the
position that theft, even felony theft crimes, do61 not qualify
as crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement."
Indiana has the seventh most restrictive rule. 62 Thi
rule authorizes the admission of evidence that any witness
including the accused was convicted of nine specified
serious crimes or attempts of those crimes, as well as all
crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement." 63 For some
reason, probably historical, "perjury" is included among the
laundry list of specified offenses despite the fact that it is
obviously a crime of "false statement." 64 Significantly,
perjury is the only crime among those listed which by
element analysis satisfies even the minimum admission
standard of being logically relevant to prove of a propensity
to lie. 65 Moreover, the Indiana rule continues the almost
of failing to define "dishonesty" or "false
universal pattern
66
statement."
The Indiana rule adopts a two standards approach in
contrast to the federal rule's three standards. The Indiana
and federal rules are identical for all witnesses with respect
to the standard for admitting convictions to impeach based
on crimes punishable by less than a year in jail, per se
excluding the vast majority of such convictions as
impeachment evidence. The Indiana rule, however, per se
excludes a much higher percentage of all convictions for
crimes punishable by more than a year in prison for all
Id. No mention is made of the definition of these concepts in the
official commentary to the rule.
62 IND. R. EvID. 609(a) (2004).
63 Id. The specific crimes identified in the rule are arson, burglary,
criminal confinement, kidnapping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, and
treason. Id. Including attempts of these crimes does not expand the
number of qualified crimes to possibly include misdemeanors because
the Indiana Penal Code provides that attempts are graded the same as
the completed crime; IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 (2004).
64 Id. The Committee Commentary expressly asserted that the rule
reflected
an express policy decision to preserve prior Indiana law.
65
Id.See discussion infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
66 IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1.
61
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witnesses.67 This large percentage of per se exclusions for

most convictions of serious crimes more than offsets the
fact that the Indiana rule authorizes a higher percentage of
per se admissions of such crimes than the federal rule, but
only a relatively small percentage of convictions for the
nine crimes specifically identified in its rule. 68 Overall, the
Indiana rule admits convictions to impeach more liberally
than the Michigan rule because, while the two states have
the identical standard for all witnesses with regard to the
admission of convictions for crimes punishable by a year or
less in prison to impeach, Michigan per se excludes an even
higher percentage of convictions for crimes punishable by
more than a year in prison. 69
West Virginia has the eighth most restrictive rule
among these states. This rule is identical to the federal
standard with regard to the impeachment of all other
witnesses except the accused, but provides much greater
protection to the accused by restricting admission to
impeach the accused to only convictions for two crimes"perjury" and "false swearing.' 70 "Perjury" and "false
swearing" are specific crimes with specific definitions in
the West Virginia Penal Code. 7 ' Under the West Virginia
67

Id.

The Indiana

Rule

Advisory

Committee

commentary

accompanying the rule, expressly asserted that the rule reflected an
express policy decision to reject the approach taken in the federal rule.
IND. CODE § 35-41-5-1 advisory committee cmt. Recent statistical
compilation of Indiana convictions, for example, provide conclusive
evidence that convictions for the nine identified -felonies in the Indiana
rule accounted for no more than fifteen percent of all felony
convictions in Indiana in 2003. Ind. Supreme Court, Div. of St. Ct.
Admin. Court Mgmt. and Statistics, 2003 Trial Court Disposition

Statistics,
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/courtmgmt/stats/2003.html
visited Apr. 1, 2006).
68

69
70

(last

See supra notes 17, 25 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
W. VA. EvID. 609.

71 W. VA. CODE

§§ 61-5-1, 61-5-2. Perjury is graded as a felonypunishable potentially by a maximum of more than one year in prison,
and false swearing is graded as a misdemeanor, punishable potentially
by a maximum of less than one year in prison.
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rule, a perjury or false swearing conviction is per se
admissible against the accused.72
The West Virginia rule, like the federal rule,
employs three standards to regulate the admission of
convictions to impeach. The two standards that mimic the
federal rule with regard to all other witnesses except the
accused more liberally admit convictions against such
witnesses than the rules of all the states ranked overall as
having a more restrictive standard. These two standards are
more liberal because they either more easily admit
convictions involving dishonesty or false statement against
such witnesses or more easily admit convictions based
solely on the fact that the maximum punishment for the
underlying crime exceeds one year. This rule also fails to
the crimes of "dishonesty" and "false
expressly define
73
statement."
Vermont has the ninth most restrictive rule. This
rule applies to all witnesses, without an express exception
in the text of the rule for the accused. It authorizes the
admission of convictions to impeach when the crime has an
element of "untruthfulness" or "falsification," unless its
is
probative value to establish a propensity to lie 74
substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect.
According to the Reporter's Notes to the 1989 amendment,
the rule committee substituted "untruthfulness" for
"dishonesty," and "falsification" for "false statements" to
embody an express policy decision. 75 The policy goal was
to avoid the possibility that the Vermont courts would
broadly interpret the terms "dishonesty" and "false
statements," especially the term "dishonesty" as courts in
other jurisdictions had done. 76 The Reporter's Notes made
express reference to decisions from other jurisdictions
72

W. VA. EVID. 609.

73 id.
74

VT.

75
id.
76

R. EvID. 609.

VT. R. EvID. 609 reporter's cmt.
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which had held that "dishonest" crimes included such
offenses as burglary, drug offenses, shoplifting, larceny,
and other offenses which are inadmissible to impeach under
77
Vermont's amended concept of "untruthfulness.,
Although the text of the rule does not define
"untruthfulness" or "falsification," it does expressly limit
the determination of whether a crime is within either of
these concepts to an examination of the statutory elements
of the crime. 78
The Vermont rule's second standard for admitting
convictions to impeach also applies to all witnesses, and
authorizes admission of Vermont felony convictions which
includes crimes punishable by more than two years of
imprisonment under Vermont law and crimes punishable
by more than one year in jail under the law of other
jurisdictions provided that the probative value to establish a
propensity to lie substantially outweighs its unfair
prejudicial effect. 79
Collectively, the two Vermont
standards restrict the admission of convictions to impeach
the accused and all other witnesses more than the federal
rule both with regard to crimes punishable by a maximum
sentence of more than one year, as well as those punishable
by one year or less. The greatest difference in the
restriction on use of convictions to impeach is with regard
to other witnesses and the attempt to admit convictions
based on the fact that the underlying crime is punishable by
more than one year in prison. The federal rule's balancing
standard is tilted towards admission, while the Vermont
standard is tilted towards exclusion. On the other hand, the
Vermont rule is not as restrictive as the West Virginia rule,
because the difference in the latter's greater protection of
the accused exceeds the difference in the former's greater
protection of all other witnesses. Finally, the Vermont rule
77 id.
78
79

VT. R. EvID. 609.
id.
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is also potentially more restrictive than the federal rule and

most other state rules on its face because of its requirement
that the trial judge expressly state the factors used in
making the admissibility balancing evaluation. 80
Idaho has the tenth most restrictive rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. This rule applies to all
witnesses, without an express exception in the text of the
rule for the accused, and authorizes the potential admission
of all "felonies." 81 The Idaho rule is the first rule in this
progression which only makes reference to the generic
concept of "felonies." Under the Idaho rule, however,
felony convictions are only admissible to impeach a
witness if the trial judge determines that the conviction is
relevant to prove a propensity to lie, and that when weighed
on an evenly balanced scale, the probative value is greater
than the prejudicial effect to the party offering the
witness.82 On the other hand, Idaho is one of the few states
whose rule does not independently authorize even the
potential admission of convictions for "misdemeanors"
crimes-punishable by a maximum prison term of one year
83
or less-that involve "dishonesty" or "false statements."
80 id.

81IDAHO R. EVID.

609.

Id. (specifically requiring that the judge must establish that the fact
and the nature of the felony are relevant with regard to the issue of the
witnesses' credibility).
83 See supra notes 29-30, 32-33 for a discussion of the appropriate
definition of "dishonesty" and "false statement" as surrogates for
relevance to prove a propensity to lie, as well as the current available
data on the annual number of persons convicted of a felony-for the
most part, crimes punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than one year. Unfortunately, while the National Center for State
Courts has begun a project to systematically collect data about the
number and types of annual convictions for misdemeanors in the states,
the first reporting date is not until the second half of 2005. Telephone
conversation with Matthew J. Durose, BJS Staff Statistician (Fall
2004). Mr. Durose is the co-author of all three of the reports on Felony
Convictions in State Courts, 1998, 2000, 2002, supra note 32. In the
few states which did report their total misdemeanor convictions, the
dimension of those convictions may be evidenced by the fact that in
82
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Idaho is the third state potentially admitting convictions to
impeach, which employs a single standard for making that
determination
in contrast to the federal rule's three
84
standards.
The Idaho standard, like the Vermont standard,
restricts the admission of convictions to impeach the
accused and all other witnesses more than the federal rule
both with regard to crimes punishable by a maximum
sentence of more than one year, as well as those punishable
by one year or less. The greatest difference between the
Idaho rule and the federal rule is in the degree of restriction
on the use of convictions to impeach with regard to other
witnesses and the attempt to admit convictions based on the
fact that the underlying crime is punishable by more than
one year in jail. The federal rule's balancing standard is
tilted towards admission, while the Idaho standard is an
evenly balanced scale evaluation, weighing probative value
to prove a propensity to lie against the likely unfair
prejudice that will result if the conviction is admitted.
The Idaho rule's classification as being more
restrictive than the federal rule must be qualified, however,
because it expressly authorizes the admission of both the
"fact" of and the "nature" of a felony conviction or both if
their relevance to prove a propensity to lie outweighs their
prejudicial effect.
Although the rule does not define it,
the "nature" of the crime does expressly distinguish
between the "nature"
of the crime and the "circumstances
86
conviction."
the
of
2002 alone there were more than 276,000 misdemeanor convictions in
the state of Florida. Fla. Trial Courts, Summary Reporting System,
2002
available
at
http://www.flcourts.org/gen public/stratplan/tcpanda.shtml (last visited
May
24, 2006).
84
Id. See discussion supra notes 50, 56 and accompanying text.
85 IDAHO R. EVID. 609.
86
Id.If only the fact of the conviction is introduced to impeach a party,
the party can introduce the nature, but not the circumstances of that
conviction.

32

2:2 TENNESSEE

JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY

271

On the other hand, the Idaho rule is not as
restrictive as the Vermont rule, because the latter's greater
protection of the accused and all other witnesses with
respect to the admission of convictions based upon fact that
the underlying crimes are punishable by more than one year
in prison, exceeds the former's slightly greater protection
of all witnesses with regard to the per se exclusion of
87
convictions for crimes punishable by a year or less in jail.
Arizona, Maine, Maryland, South Dakota, and
Texas share the eleventh most restrictive rule among those
states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. These five states have
two standards rules, which admit convictions for crimes
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement" or those
relevant to a prove propensity to lie, as well as convictions
for crimes which are within a broad qualifying concept
against all witnesses. This includes the pervasive reference
to crimes punishable by more than one year in prison in
three state rules, and also to alternative references including
"infamous crimes" and crimes of "moral turpitude., 88 To
32-35 and accompanying text.
609 (mimicking the language of the federal rule and
making no reference to "felony," instead identifying crimes whose
punishment provides for the possibility of imprisonment for more than
one year and any crime of dishonesty or false statement); ME. R. EVID.
609 (identifying crimes with punishments of one year or more and any
crime of dishonesty or false statement); MD. R. EvID. 5-609 (admitting
convictions for "infamous" crimes or other crimes relevant to
credibility). By using the generic reference to relevance, the Maryland
rule opens the door to the admission of a broader category of
misdemeanors than those within this article's relatively narrow
definition of crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement." While
purporting to reflect some study of the federal rule, the rule, in fact,
was virtually identical to the prior Maryland rule. MD.R. EVID. 1-502
(1992). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-12 (2004) (allowing the
admission of crimes punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year
and crimes of dishonesty or false statement); TEX. R. EvID. 609
(felonies and moral turpitude misdemeanors potentially qualified as
admissible conviction). Like the Maryland rule, the Texas rule also
lends itself to possibly admitting a broader range of misdemeanor
convictions to impeach.
87 See supra notes
88 ARIZ. R. EVID.

33

2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 272

be admitted, however, once a conviction of a crime deemed
to fall within one of these categories, it must then undergo a
similar balancing evaluation. A trial judge is required to
determine the probative value of the conviction as proof of
a propensity to lie, and then weigh it on an evenly balanced
scale against the prejudicial effect to any party opponent
except the prosecution in a criminal case. 89 Under the
federal rule, not even the accused that chooses to testify is
protected by this evenly weighted balancing evaluation
against the admission of the complete range of convictions
authorized to impeach. 90
On the other hand, the overall effect of the two
standards of these states is to more liberally admit
convictions to impeach than the proceeding ten standards,
because a broader range of convictions are qualified for
admission than in all of the proceeding states with respect
to the accused, all other witnesses, or both. The balancing
standard employed in these five states is also tilted more
towards admission than the Vermont rule, ranked ninth.
For example, "infamous crimes" and "moral turpitude" are
not defined by the rules employing these terms. The term
seems to be a vestige of these states' common law standard
for admitting convictions to impeach. 91 Like the federal
rule, and the rules in many of the states with even more
restrictive
admission
standards, crimes
involving
89 ARIZ. R. EvID. 609 (mimicking the federal rule and making no

reference to "felony" instead identifying crimes whose punishment
provides for the possibility of imprisonment for more than one year,
and any crime of dishonesty or false statement); MD. R. EVID. 5-609
(allowing convictions for "infamous" crimes, and crimes of dishonesty
and false statement); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-12 (2004)
(admitting evidence of convictions for crimes punishable by
imprisonment in excess of one year and crimes of dishonesty or false
statement); TEX. R. EVID. 609 (qualifying moral turpitude
misdemeanors as admissible convictions).
90 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
91MD. R. EVID. 5-609 (admitting convictions for "infamous" crimes or
other crimes relevant to credibility); TEX. R. EvID. 609 (qualifying
"moral turpitude" misdemeanors as admissible convictions).
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"dishonesty" or "false statement" are specifically
mentioned in three of these rules, but these terms are not
defined. 92 The commentary to the Arizona rule, however,
does provide a guideline stating that the determination of
whether a crime qualifies as a crime of dishonesty or false
be made by reference only to the elements
statement should
93
of the crime.
Next, Connecticut has the twelfth most restrictive
94
rule.
The Connecticut rule mimics the standard that
evolved in its state supreme court, which identified three
policy factors to be used by trial judges in determining the
admissibility, against all witnesses, of the single category
of eligible convictions-those for which the underlying
95
crime was punishable by more than one year in prison.
The three policy factors identified in the rule are: (1) the
extent of the prejudice likely to arise; (2) the significance of
the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness; and (3) the
remoteness in time of the conviction. 96 The Connecticut
rule does not expressly direct the judge to balance these
three factors, nor specify the relative weight to be given
each factor. It also does not identify the balancing standard
trial judges should employ in determining the ultimate issue
of admissibility by using these three factors. Connecticut
does have a generic admissibility balancing rule, which, if
held applicable to this standard, would require admission,
unless concerns raised with regard to exclusionary policies
substantially outweigh the probative value of the crime
92

ARIz. R. EVID.

609;

ME. R. EVID.

609; S.D. CODIFIED

LAWS § 19-14-

12 (2004).

93 ARIz. R. EvID.

609 cmt.

94 CONN. CODE EVID. § 6-7 (2004).
95 Id. Connecticut also has a statute, CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-145

(2004), the text of which conflicts with the evidence rule, and more
permissively admits convictions to impeach than the federal rule. Prior
to the enactment of the evidence rule, however, the Connecticut
Supreme Court had placed the same limits on admissibility under the
terms of the statute that were enacted into the express language of the
evidence rule.
96

CONN. CODE EVID. § 6-7 (2004).
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97
underlying the conviction to prove a propensity to lie.
The Connecticut standard's ambiguities make it
unclear if it is less restrictive than the federal rule with
respect to its authorization of the admission of convictions
to impeach when the underlying crime was punishable by
more than one year in prison. In giving consideration to
both the two-to-one ratio of exclusionary concerns to
admissibility concerns and to the possibility that the generic
balancing standard is employed, it is arguable that it more
liberally admits convictions for such crimes against the
accused than the federal rule, but more restrictively admits
such convictions against all other witnesses. It is clear,
however, that the Connecticut rule is significantly more
liberal in admitting convictions to impeach for this large
category of crimes than almost all of the state rules that are
more restrictive than the Connecticut rule. Connecticut is
the fourth state admitting convictions to impeach that
employs a single standard for making that determination in
contrast to the federal rule's three standards. Connecticut,
like Idaho, is only the second state whose rule does not
independently authorize even the potential admission of
convictions for misdemeanor crimes of "dishonesty" or
"false statement." Therefore, the Connecticut rule is more
restrictive than the federal rule with regard to such crimes,
as well as a substantial majority of the states with more
restrictive rules. As explained in the earlier discussion of
the Idaho rule, its rank is attributable to the fact that there
are far more convictions for crimes punishable by more
than one year in prison, than for misdemeanors
appropriately characterized for impeachment98 purposes as
involving "dishonesty" or "false statements."
Georgia has the thirteenth most restrictive rule
among those states whose rules admit convictions to

97 CONN. CODE EVID.

§ 4-3 (2004).

98 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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impeach more restrictively than the federal rule. 99 Georgia
has two statutes which the Georgia Supreme Court
historically interpreted to authorize the admission of any
conviction of a crime punishable by a maximum term of
more than one year in prison and all crimes of "moral
turpitude" to impeach any witness, except the accused. l00
The Georgia standards do not define "moral turpitude," a
common law concept, but the Georgia Supreme Court has
narrowly defined the term for this purpose.'01
Additionally, one of the statutes expressly bars
impeachment of the accused,02unless that person first puts
his or her credibility at issue. 1
Overall, the impeachment standards of the Georgia
rule are more restrictive than the federal rule. The Georgia
standards include a blanket exclusionary policy with regard
to the accused that is much more restrictive than that of the
federal rule, which mandates the admission of convictions
for any crime characterized as involving "dishonesty" or
"false statement" to impeach the accused. It also authorizes
the admission of convictions for all crimes punishable by a
maximum of more than one year in prison against the
accused following a balancing evaluation. This difference
more than compensates for the fact that the Georgia
standards much more liberally admit convictions for crimes
punishable by a maximum sentence of more than one year
in prison against all other witnesses than the federal rule,
and to a lesser extent more liberally admit convictions for
of
crimes punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment
03
witnesses.'
other
all
against
one year or less
99 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-20, 24-9-84 (2004).
10o Id. (combining the substance of FED. R. EvID. 608 and FED. R. EVID.

609).
101Hawes v. State, 470 S.E.2d 664, 667 (Ga. 1996) (restricting
convictions for moral turpitude crimes for impeachment purposes to the
gravest offenses, including felonies, infamous crimes, and those that
are malum in se and disclose a depraved mind).
102 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-20 (2004).
103 See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.

The federal rule
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On the other hand, the Georgia rule more liberally
admits convictions to impeach than the Connecticut
standard. Connecticut's exclusionary standards with regard
to all other witnesses are much stronger than Georgia's
standards for all types of convictions, particularly for
crimes punishable by more than one year in prison. It more
than compensates for the fact that the Georgia standards'
blanket exclusionary policy with regard to the accused is
more restrictive than Connecticut's, which employs the
same exclusionary standards with regard to the accused as
it does for all other witnesses.
Tennessee has the fourteenth most restrictive rule
among those states whose rules admit convictions to
impeach more restrictively. Tennessee employs the same
language to identify qualifying crimes as the federal rule,
and appears in its text to adopt a two, rather than a three,
standards approach. 104 Like the federal rule, one standard
focuses solely upon the accused as a witness, but unlike the
federal rule, provides for a single standard to determine
whether a conviction should be admitted, notwithstanding
whether it qualifies because the crime was punishable by
more than one year in prison or was properly characterized
as involving "dishonesty" or "false statement."' 5 The rule
requires that the trial judge undertake a balancing
evaluation, comparing the probative value of the conviction
for any qualifying crime as proof of a propensity to lie with
a likely unfair prejudice that notice of the conviction will
cause with regard to distorting the jury's resolution of the
substantive issues in the case.
Only when the probative
value of the conviction outweighs the likelihood of unfair
does authorize the admission against all other witnesses of convictions
for another forty percent of all crimes, if the probative value of such a
conviction to prove a propensity to lie is not substantially outweighed
by exclusionary concerns, a balancing standard which is tilted toward
admission.
104
TENN. R. EvID. 609(a).
105
TENN. R. EVID. 609(a)(3).
106 id-
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prejudice is the conviction admissible. 107 Hence, the
Tennessee rule regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach the accused is clearly more restrictive than the
federal rule, which would automatically admit convictions
for crimes of dishonesty or false statement.
The Tennessee standard is also more restrictive than
the Pennsylvania and Michigan rules with regard to
convictions involving crimes of dishonesty and false
statement because those states' rules also authorize the per
10 8
se admission of such convictions against the accused.
The rules in these two states, however, disqualify all or
almost all convictions punishable by more than one year in
The
prison as an independent basis to impeach.'0 9
federal
by
the
begun
the
pattern
rule
continues
Tennessee
rule, which is followed by all the states rules evaluated so
far, of not defining the terms "dishonesty" or "false
statement" when those terms are used to identify those
convictions which qualify for admission to impeach.
On its face, the Tennessee rule provides less
protection to witnesses other than the accused than the
federal rule because it not only appears to authorize
automatic admission of convictions involving crimes of
dishonesty or false statement, but also any conviction
which potentially qualifies for admission based solely on
the fact it was punishable by more than a year in prison. 110
The Advisory Committee Comment, however, asserts that
the intent of the rule for such witnesses is to integrate the
rule within the core evidence admissibility rule, which is
pervasively applicable throughout these comprehensive
evidence codes, and which requires that admissibility of
107 id.
108 See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text. The seventh most
restrictive overall ranked rule is more restrictive than the Tennessee
rule with regard to crimes involving "dishonesty" or "false statement"
because it eliminates these characterizations as a basis for an
independent admission to impeach.
109 See discussion supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text.
110 TENN. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
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any item of evidence is conditioned upon its proponent
proving that its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by exclusionary policy concerns.111
The
Committee's comments do not suggest an exception to the
application of this balancing policy evaluation for crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement, and this
interpretation of the Tennessee rule would make it more
restrictive than the federal
rule with regard to witnesses,
2
1
accused.'
the
than
other
Overall, the Tennessee rule is slightly more liberal
in admitting convictions to impeach than the Georgia
standard. Georgia's blanket exclusionary policy with
regard to the accused is much more restrictive than that of
the Tennessee exclusionary standards with regard to the
accused for all grades of crime, but especially those whose
admission is premised on a crime punishable by more than
one year in prison. The difference is slightly greater than
the difference between the more restrictive standards of
Tennessee with regard to all other witnesses when
compared to the standards of Georgia for such witnesses.
Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and Washington
share the fifteenth most restrictive rule among those states
whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. 113 The rule these four
states share is slightly more restrictive than the federal rule
because it requires a balancing evaluation for all witnesses,
not just the accused, which equally weighs the probative
value of the convictions for crimes punishable by a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than one year as
proof of a propensity to lie, and the countervailing
prejudicial effect the admission of such a conviction will
cause to the parties or the witness. 1 4 Like the federal rule,
111 TENN. R. EVID. 609 advisory commission's cmt.
113 ARK.

R. EVID.
114

R. EVID. 609;
609.

ARK. R. EVID.

609;

DEL.

R. EvID. 609;

MINN. R. EVID.

609;

WASH.

609;

MINN. R. EVID.

609;

WASH.

DEL. R. EvID.
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the rules of these states mandate admission of all
convictions for crimes involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement" against any witness. 115 The rules in these four
states also fail to expressly define crimes of "dishonesty" or
However, the commentary to the
"false statement. ' l
are only
Minnesota rule asserts that crimes of "dishonesty"
7
"
conduct.
untruthful
involve
which
crimes
those
The rule in these four states, as in nine of the
eighteen states which are ranked as more restrictive,
embodies a two standards approach to the evaluation of the
admissibility of convictions for the purpose of
impeachment."l 8 Overall, the standards embodied in the
Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and Washington rules are
slightly more liberal in admitting convictions to impeach
than the Tennessee standard. The Tennessee standard for
all witnesses with regard to the potential admission of
convictions for crimes punishable by less than a year in
prison is slightly more restrictive because it requires some
form of a balancing evaluation, even for such offenses
properly characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false
statement," while the Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and
Washington standards mandate admission of the small
percentage of such offenses properly characterized as
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement." With regard
to convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum term of
more than one year in prison, these four states and
Tennessee employ the same even balancing standard for the
accused for all such offenses, except that these four states
mandate the admission of a small percentage of such
offenses characterized as involving "dishonesty" or "false
R. EVID. 609.
1"5

ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MiNN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.

R. EvID. 609.
116 ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MINN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.
R. EVID. 609.

609.

1 17

MtNN. R. EVID.

118

See supranotes 41, 50, 67, 88, and 103 and accompanying text.
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statement." For all other witnesses, however, the standards

of these four states are more restrictive because the
Tennessee standard adopts a balancing standard tilted
towards admission, while the Arkansas, Delaware,
Minnesota, and Washington standards employ the same
evenly balanced scale standard to such witnesses with the
exception that their rules mandate admission of the small
percentage of such offenses properly characterized
as
119
statement."
"false
or
"dishonesty"
involving
Finally, Mississippi has the sixteenth most
restrictive rule. 120 The Mississippi rule is identical to the
federal rule with regard to the impeachment of all nonparty witnesses and the accused, but provides greater
protection to civil plaintiffs and defendants when they
testify. This rule requires that the same beginning weight
be given to the probative value of convictions for crimes
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than one year as proof of a propensity to lie, as to the
countervailing prejudicial effect that the admission of such
2
a conviction will cause to that testifying party.'1
Mississippi is the first state, among the twenty-four states
with more restrictive rules than the federal rule, to adopt a
four standards approach. 122 Although this rule also fails to
expressly define crimes of "dishonesty" and "false
statement," the official comments to this rule indicate
that
23
the intent was to narrowly define these concepts. 1
Overall, the Mississippi rule is slightly more liberal
in authorizing the admission of convictions to impeach
than the standards shared in the rules of the four states'l9
ARK. R. EVID. 609; DEL. R. EvID. 609; MiNN. R. EVID. 609; WASH.
R.
EvID.
609.
120
MISS. R. EvID.

609.

Id.

121
122 id.

123 Miss. R. EvID. 609 cmt ("dishonesty or false statement" means
crimes such as perjury or subordination of perjury, false statement,
fraud, forgery, embezzlement, false pretense, or other offense in the
nature of crimenfalsi).
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Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, and Washington-ranked
just above it as more restrictive. The sole difference is with
regard to non-party witnesses who have a conviction for a
crime punishable by more than one year in jail. The
Mississippi standard employs a balancing standard tilted
towards admission while the standard of the four states
employs an evenly weighted balancing evaluation. Illinois
has the seventeenth and therefore most liberal rule among
those states whose rules admit convictions to impeach more
restrictively than the federal rule. Among these rules,
therefore, it is the state whose standards are closest to the
federal rule. This rule was adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court. 124 The court adopted what it characterized as the
proposed federal rule, which provides greater protection to
all witnesses than the enacted or current federal rule by
requiring a balancing evaluation, albeit one tilted towards
admission, for crimes of "dishonesty" and "false
The Illinois Supreme Court did not
statement."'1 25
generally define crimes of "dishonesty" or "false
statement" in its decisions. The rule provides for the same
standard for convictions to impeach for crimes potentially
punishable by a maximum of more than one year in prison
for all witnesses including the accused. Hence, Illinois is
the fifth state to adopt a one standard approach. The
Illinois standard provides greater protection to the accused
and all other witnesses with regard to the small percentage
of convictions for crimes appropriately characterized as
involving "dishonesty" or "false statement." The Illinois
rule requires a balancing evaluation, while the federal rule
The Illinois
automatically admits such convictions.
standard provides less protection than the federal rule to the
accused with regard to the admission of convictions to
impeach solely because they are punishable by a maximum
sentence of more than one year in prison. It requires a
124 People v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. 1971).
125 id.
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balancing evaluation titled towards admission, rather than
the evenly weighted balancing evaluation required by the
federal rule. The rule employs the same standard as the
federal rule with regard to this category of convictions for
all other witnesses.
Overall, the Illinois rule is only slightly more liberal
than the Mississippi rule with regard to its standards on the
admission of convictions to impeach. The Mississippi rule
is more restrictive than the Illinois standard with regard to
the admission of convictions to impeach the accused and
civil party witnesses based upon the underlying crime
having a maximum term of imprisonment of more than a
year. While both require a balancing evaluation, the
Illinois rule is tilted towards admission. Because this
evaluation is premised on evidence that the admission of
convictions to impeach is more significant when the
admission is against party witnesses than other witnesses,
the Mississippi rule is a more restrictive rule. This
determination was made though the Mississippi standard is
more liberal than the Illinois standard with regard to
admitting convictions to impeach civil witnesses other than
party witnesses for such offenses, and all witnesses of
convictions for crimes punishable by a maximum prison
term of one year or less.
D. States Whose Rules More Liberally
Admit Convictions to Impeach Than the
Federal Rule
Seventeen of fifty states, by rule or statute, more
liberally admit convictions to impeach than the federal
rule. 126
These seventeen states employ ten distinct
126 CAL. EvID. CODE

§ 788 (2004); COLO.

REv. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-90-

101 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-610 (2004) (The Florida Evidence
Code was enacted in 1976.); Ky. R. EVID. 609 (effective 1990,
amended in 1992); LA CODE EvID. ANN. arts. 609, 609.1 (2004)
(effective 1989, and amended 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
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standards which are overall more liberal in admitting
convictions to impeach than the federal rule. In the
following discussion, similar state rules will be grouped
and discussed sequentially, beginning with the most liberal
admission rules, and proceeding to the states' rules whose
standards are only slightly more liberal than the federal
rule.
Three states, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New
York, have rules which authorize the admission of any
criminal conviction to impeach. 127 This standard does not
appear among a series of evidence rules in two of these
states, but rather among the general statutes of these states
by the
reflecting a long-standing state policy unaffected
128
rule.
federal
the
of
evolution
or
enactment
North Carolina has the second most liberal
admission rule among those states whose rules admit
convictions to impeach more liberally than the federal
rule. 129 The North Carolina rule employs a single standard
authorizing the impeachment of any witness with a
conviction of any crime punishable by confinement for
§ 21 (West 2004) (authorizing even the use of traffic offenses to
impeach); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.050 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
27-609 (LexisNexis 2004) (rule enacted in 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 50.095 (2004); N.H. R. EVID. 609 (LexisNexis 2004) (effective
1985); N.J. R. EVID. 609; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4513 (McKinney 2004) (first
enacted on or before 1920), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWS § 60.40(1) (2004);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 609 (2004) (enacted in 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40-355 (2004) (enacted in 1981) R.I. R. EVID. 609 (adopted in
1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2-269 (2004) (containing rule for criminal
trials, while Payne v. Carroll, 461 S.E.2d 837 (Va. 1995), announced
the rule for civil trials); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004)
(Wisconsin Supreme Court enacted the rule in 1973 and it became
effective in 1974).
127 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (2004) (authorizing even the
use of traffic offenses to impeach.); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.050 (2004);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. S 4513(2003), N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAWS § 60.40(1)
(2004).
128 Massachusetts originally enacted its statute in 1836, and enacted its
last significant substantive amendment with regard to all crimes except
traffic offenses in 1950. Similarly, the current New York statutes
from statues antedating 1930.
derived
129
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 609 (2004).
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more than sixty days.' 3 0 The official commentary to this

rule makes reference to its departure from the federal rule
and the historic North Carolina rule, which admitted any
conviction to impeach any witness.' 31 The current North
Carolina rule is much closer to its historical rule than the
federal rule. Most convictions are admitted against all
witnesses without evaluating if they are even relevant to

prove a propensity to lie, and therefore, trial judges are
never required to make the next sequential evaluation of
exclusionary concerns.
New Jersey has the third most liberal admission
1
32
rule.
The New Jersey rule employs a single standard
authorizing the admission of convictions for any crime to
impeach all witnesses. The rule gives the trial judge
generic discretion to exclude for other causes, and
identifies "remoteness" as the only specific exclusionary
cause. 133 The New Jersey rule does not expressly direct the
judge to balance "remoteness" or any other identified
exclusionary policy against the probative value of the
conviction to prove a propensity to lie, nor does it specify
the relative weight to be given identified factors, or the
balancing standard the trial judge should employ in
determining the ultimate issue of admissibility.
The New Jersey rule establishes a standard far more
liberal than the federal rule in admitting convictions to
impeach. The New Jersey rule authorizes the admission of
convictions for all crimes punishable by a maximum term
of imprisonment of one year or less against all witnesses,
including the accused, subject only to the possibility that a
judge might find that the conviction is too remote. The
federal rule, however, presumptively excludes the
Id. (referring to term "felony" without defining it, as well as to
certain categories of misdemeanors which encompass all of those
crimes punishable by more than sixty days confinement).
131 id.
132 N.J. R. EvID. 609 (enacted in 1993).
133
id.
130
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substantial majority of such convictions to impeach any
witness. 134 The New Jersey rule also authorizes the
admission of convictions for all crimes punishable by a
maximum of more than one year in prison against all
witnesses, including the accused, subject to the same
possibility of discretionary judicial balancing, while the
federal rule requires some level of balancing of an array of
value
identified exclusionary concerns against the probative
135
lie.
to
propensity
a
prove
to
conviction
a
such
of
Overall, the New Jersey standard is less liberal in
admitting convictions to impeach than that of North
Carolina. Unlike the North Carolina rule, the New Jersey
rule places some potential restraint on the admission of all
convictions to impeach, regardless of their proscribed
maximum term of imprisonment.
Louisiana has the fourth most liberal admission rule
among those states whose rules admit convictions to
impeach more liberally than the federal rule. 136 Louisiana
has two rules, one authorizing the admission of convictions
to impeach in civil cases, and the other authorizing the
cases.137
admission of convictions to impeach in criminal
The civil rule has two standards authorizing the admission
of all convictions against all civil litigation witnesses for
crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than six
months, provided that their probative value outweighs the
unfair prejudice caused. The second rule appears to
mandate the admission of all convictions for crimes of
"dishonesty" and "false statement."' 138 Like the federal
rule, this rule-and the rules of almost all the states
employing these concepts-does not define "dishonesty" or
"false statement." 139 The criminal rule, in contrast to the
134 See supra text proceeding note 17.

35 See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
136

LA.CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609, 609.1 (2004).

137 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609, 609.1 (2004).
138
LA.CODE EVID. ANN. art. 609 (2004).
139 id.
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federal and most state rules, more liberally admits
convictions to impeach in criminal cases than in civil
cases-authorizing the admission of any conviction
to
40
1
accused.
the
including
witness
criminal
any
impeach
Overall, the Louisiana standards are less liberal than
the New Jersey standard. The primary reason for the
ranking is that the Louisiana standard has a much more
exclusionary and potentially exclusionary standard with
regard to all civil witnesses. Louisiana, for example,
requires exclusion of most offenses punishable by a
maximum term of a year or less in prison against all civil
witnesses including party witnesses, while the uniform
New Jersey standard is fairly characterized as significantly
tilted towards the admission of convictions for such
offenses against such witnesses. In the evaluation protocol,
this difference more than compensates for the fact that the
Louisiana standards mandate the admission of convictions
for all offenses, regardless of their proscribed maximum
period of imprisonment, against all witnesses including the
accused at criminal trials, while the single standard New
Jersey rule is only significantly tilted towards admission of
all convictions at criminal trials.
Rhode Island and Wisconsin have the fifth most
liberal admission rules among those states whose rules
admit convictions to impeach more liberally than the
federal rule. 14 1 Both states have adopted the same one
standard rule which authorizes the possible admission of
any conviction to impeach any witness provided that the
trial judge, in the exercise of her discretion, finds that the
probative value of the conviction, as proof of a propensity
to lie, is not substantially outweighed by the unfair
prejudicial effect caused by its admission. 142 This standard
potentially authorizes the admission to impeach the accused
140 LA. CODE EVID. ANN. Ann. art. 609.1 (2004).
14' R.I. R. EVID. 609; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004).
142R.I. R. EvID. 609; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004).
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and all other witnesses with a much greater percentage of
convictions for crimes punishable by a year or less then
does the federal rule. It provides slightly less protection to
the accused and slightly more protection to all other
witnesses than the federal rule with regard to the admission
to impeach with convictions for crimes punishable by more
than one year in prison. 143 Rhode Island and Wisconsin
currently employ this considerably more liberal standard
because of an express policy choice-rejecting merely
mimicking the federal rule and opting instead to embody an
earlier federal approach as their standard. 144
Overall, the monolithic standard of Rhode Island
and Wisconsin is less liberal than that of Louisiana.
Primarily, the Louisiana criminal trial standard mandates
admission of conviction for all offenses against all
witnesses including the accused at criminal trials,
regardless of their proscribed maximum period of
imprisonment. Therefore, the Louisiana criminal trial
standard is significantly more liberal in criminal cases than
the rule of these two states. This difference is more than
enough to outstrip the fact that the uniform Rhode Island
and Wisconsin standard is tilted toward the admission of
convictions to impeach regardless of their proscribed
maximum period of imprisonment at civil, as well as
criminal trials. The uniform Rhode Island and Wisconsin
standard more liberally admits convictions at civil trials
than the Louisiana standard, which requires of a majority of
offenses punishable by a maximum term of a year or less in
prison exclusion from use as impeachment for any witness,
and an even balancing evaluation as the basis for admitting
convictions to impeach when the underlying crime was
R.I. R. EVID. 609; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.09 (West 2004).
144Both the comment to the Rhode Island rule and the comment to the
Wisconsin rule demonstrate a careful evaluation of the federal rule and
proposed federal rule on the admission of convictions to impeach. The
Rhode Island Evidence Advisory Committee Notes compared and
contrasted each sub-section of its rule with the position taken on the
same issue under the federal rule.
14'
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punishable by more than a year in prison.
Next, Oregon has the sixth most liberal admission
rule among those states whose rules admit convictions to
impeach more liberally than the federal rule. 145 Oregon has
revised its rule several times in the past fifteen years, and
currently employs a two standards approach. The first
standard authorizes the admission of any conviction to
impeach any witness if the underlying crime is punishable
by a maximum term of more than one year in prison, and
the second standard authorizes the admission of a
conviction for a crime of "dishonesty" or "false statement"
146
no matter how it is graded for punishment purposes.
Additionally, the Oregon rule continues the almost
universal pattern
of failing to define "dishonesty" or "false
47
statement."
The Oregon rule more liberally admits convictions
than does the federal rule because its first standard admits
any conviction if the underlying crime is punishable by a
maximum term of more than one year in prison without
requiring an evaluation of the probative value of the
conviction to prove a propensity to lie against the
exclusionary concerns it implicates. Like the Louisiana
rule, the Oregon rule authorizes a broader admission than
the federal rule for criminal trials, but only against the
accused even if to a more limited degree. 148
The Oregon legislature has made a conscious
decision to pervert its convictions for purposes of the
145 OR. REv. STAT. § 40-355(1) (2004).

146 Id. The Oregon legislature, in combination with ballot initiatives,
has produced a rather frenetic rate of amending the state's rule;
amendments were enacted in 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2001. The
legislature amended the rule for a fifth time in 2003, a change which
became effective January 1, 2004. The effect of the 2004 amendments
was to add an additional misdemeanor assaultive type of crime to the
list of those which can be used for impeachment purposes. Now there
are twenty-two serious assaultive crimes that can be introduced into
evidence to impeach the credibility of a witness.
147 Id.

148OR. REV. STAT. § 40-355(2) (2004).
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impeachment rule by adopting a policy that seeks to

enhance the likelihood that a person accused of a serious
assault crime, who testifies, can be convicted based on
propensity evidence, under the guise of authorizing the
impeachment with prior convictions for misdemeanor
assault against a family or household member. 149 The
Oregon rule seeks to achieve this goal by authorizing the
admission of prior assault convictions punishable by a
maximum period of imprisonment of less than one year in
prison, if committed by the accused against a family or
household member. 150 Overall, the Oregon rule less
liberally admits convictions to impeach than the prior five
standards because it is the first rule in the sequence of rules
categorized as more liberal than the federal rule, which
automatically excludes the substantial majority of all
convictions of crimes punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of one year or less.
Florida and Nebraska have the seventh most liberal
admission rule among those states whose rules admit
convictions to impeach more liberally than the federal
rule. 15 1 These states employ a two standards rule, which
authorizes the admission to impeach any witness of any
conviction for crimes potentially punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year, and for any
conviction of a crime involving "dishonesty" or "false
These statutes' 53 also fail to define
statement." 152
"dishonesty" or "false statement."'
These states, like Oregon, more liberally admit
convictions than does the federal rule. They admit criminal
convictions solely because the maximum punishment
149 Id.

15 0

id.

151 FLA.

STAT. ANN.

§ 90-610 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-

609 (LexisNexis 2004).
152

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-6 10 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-

609 (LexisNexis 2004).
153

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-6 10 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-

609 (LexisNexis 2004).
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exceeds one year without weighing the probative value of
proving a propensity to lie against the exclusionary policies
violated if the conviction is admitted. The Oregon rule is
slightly more liberal because the Oregon legislature has
authorized a larger percentage of convictions for crimes
punishable by a maximum of less than one year in jail to
impeach the accused.
Virginia has the eighth most liberal admission rule.
The criminal trial rule that its supreme court adopted to
apply to party witnesses in civil cases. The rule authorizes
the admission to impeach with the fact but not the name of
any felony conviction, except that the proponent can
identify by name that a conviction was for perjury. 15 4 The
implication of this rule is that for any non-party civil
witness, convictions of any crime, including misdemeanor
convictions, could be used to impeach without a balancing
evaluation. The inference to be drawn from the Virginia
Supreme Court decision is that even the name of the crime
underlying any conviction of such a witness could be
referenced.
Like the Florida, Nebraska, and Oregon standards,
the Virginia standard more liberally admits convictions to
impeach than does the federal rule because it admits,
against any witness, convictions for crimes solely because
the maximum punishment exceeds one year without
weighing its probative value as proof of a propensity to lie
against the exclusionary policies violated if the conviction
is admitted. The Virginia rule also more liberally admits
misdemeanor convictions to impeach than the federal rule
with respect to non-party civil witnesses. The Virginia rule
is almost as liberal as the rule shared by Florida and
Nebraska in admitting convictions to impeach. It is ranked
as being less liberal in this analysis because it prohibits
154 VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2-269 (2004) (stating standard for criminal
trials, while Payne, 461 S.E.2d 837, states the standard for civil trials).
The Virginia code provision employs the word "felony" without
defining that term.

52

2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL

OF LAW & POLICY

291

reference to the specific name of the crime underlying the
conviction, unless the conviction was for perjury.
California, Colorado, Kentucky, and Nevada share
the ninth most liberal admission rule among those states
whose rules admit convictions to impeach more liberally
than the federal rule. 155 The one standard rule of these
states mandates admission to impeach any witness with
convictions for any crime punishable by more than one
year in prison.156 These states are categorized as more
liberally admitting convictions to impeach than the federal
rule because-while both the standard employed in these
four states and the federal rule exclude most misdemeanor
convictions to impeach-the standard of these four states
mandates the admission of any conviction for a crime
punishable by more than one year in prison against any
witness. The federal rule, in contrast, requires some form
of a balancing evaluation before such convictions are
admitted against the accused or all other witnesses. 157
However, the standards shared by these four states, place
more restrictions on the admission of convictions to
impeach overall than the Virginia rule ranked just above
them as more liberally admitting convictions to impeach.
While the standards of these four states and that of Virginia
are identical with regard to admitting convictions to
impeach the accused, criminal defense witnesses, and civil
155 CAL. EVID. CODE

§ 788 (West 2004); COLO.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-

90-101 (West 2004); KY. R. EVID. 609; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
50.095 (LexisNexis 2004).
156 CAL. EvID. CODE § 788 (West 2004) (making express reference to
the term "felony" rather than the functional and uniform length of
authorized punishment approach taken in the text of the rules in most
states); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-101 (2004) (referencing the
term "felony" and shortening the admissible period to the prior five
years in civil cases); KY. R. EVID. 609 (defining "felony" as in FED. R.
EvID. 609 and prohibiting the identification of the specific felony for
which the person was convicted, unless the witness denies the
conviction); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.095 (LexisNexis 2004)
(defining "felony" as it is defined in FED. R. EVID. 609).
M See supra notes 25, 26 and accompanying text.
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parties as witnesses, the Virginia rule sanctions the
admission of at least the fact of convictions for crimes
punishable by a year or less in prison against all other civil
witnesses.
Finally, New Hampshire has the tenth most liberal
admission rule among those states whose rules admit
convictions to impeach more liberally than the federal
rule. 5 8 Therefore, the New Hampshire rule, among the
rules of these seventeen states, has adopted standards that
are closest to the federal rule. The New Hampshire rule
authorizes the admission to impeach any witness, except
the "defendant," with a conviction for any crime punishable
by a maximum sentence of more than one year in prison
and of all convictions for crimes of "dishonesty" or "false
statement" against all witnesses. 159 This New Hampshire
rule continues the almost universal pattern of failing to
define "dishonesty" or "false statement." 60 Convictions
for crimes punishable by a maximum term of more than
one year can only be admitted against the accused if the
probative value of the conviction to prove propensity to lie
outweighs its prejudicial effect. 161
Like the federal rule, New Hampshire has adopted a
three standards rule. This rule more liberally admits
convictions to impeach than the federal rule because its
language is identical to that of the federal rule prior to
1990. The United States Supreme Court interpreted the old
federal rule to authorize admission of all "felony"
convictions to impeach any witness, except criminal
defendants, without requiring an evaluation that balances
the crime's probative value to prove a propensity to lie
against its prejudicial effect.' 62 The reporter's notes to the
58

' N.H. R. EVID. 609.

159 id.
160 id.

Id.
162 Green, 490 U.S. 504.
accompanying text.
161

See discussion supra notes 22, 23 and
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New Hampshire rule, however, make express reference to
its generic balancing standard, and imply that it is
applicable to the issue of admitting convictions to impeach
based solely on the fact the underlying crime is punishable
by more than a year in prison when the witness is anyone
other than the accused. 16 3 The rule, as modified by the
reporter's notes, would make the New Hampshire rule
similar to the current federal rule.
Overall, the New Hampshire rule does not admit
convictions to impeach as liberally as the rules of
California, Colorado, Kentucky, or Nevada. The New
Hampshire rule more liberally admits a small percentage of
convictions for crimes punishable by a year or less in
prison against all witnesses, if the convictions are properly
characterized as involving crimes of "dishonesty" or "false
statement." However, it is much more restrictive than those
states with regard to admitting convictions to impeach the
accused, and the admission of convictions for crimes
punishable by more than a year in prison.
IV.

Evaluation and Perspectives On Establishing
that Twenty-Eight Different Rule Standards
Regulate the Identical Issue in 2005 -The
Admissibility of Convictions to Impeach
A. Significant Consequences of TwentyEight State Rule Standards Regulating
the Admission of Convictions to Impeach

This section of the article begins by identifying two
significant consequences of the current reality that our
federalism has resulted in twenty-eight different state rule
standards regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. This section next identifies possible reasons that
might account for and justify a different standard for every
163 N.H. R. EVID. 609, reporter's notes.
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1.9 of the fifty states. Thereafter, this section examines
whether any of the arguably evidence-based reasons among
those identified are reality, and even if true, justify one or
any of the array of current rules. The evaluation also
provides the basis for making recommendations for reform
which are identified and discussed in the final section of the
article.
The fact that there are twenty-eight different rule
standards regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach has significant implications for lawyers and the
legal system. First, even among evidence experts, there is
confusion about the current state of the law on this issue. 164
For example, evidence experts assert that
only five states (unspecified) have identical
rules to FRE 609, while twenty-one other
states and the Texas Criminal Evidence
Rules have rules similar to FRE 609, while
ten states and Texas Civil Evidence Rules
are different or significantly modify FRE
609. Colorado is stated to have no Rule
comparable to FRE 609, while Montana is
asserted to have a rule "opposite" to that of
FRE 609. 165
Second, and even more significant, having twenty164 See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42 (John W. Strong ed.,
West 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] (implying that
convictions of all types are widely available to impeach the accused in
a criminal case, and that convictions in any state or federal court can be
used to impeach); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL: STATE
AND FEDERAL RULES 167 (3d ed. 1997) ("Below is the current version
of F.R.E. 609(a) not identical to what is found in the states, even those
with F.R.E. based codes, because of recent Congressional changes, and
also because of the greater policy disagreement here than in some other
evidence areas."); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 4
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 609.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., LexisNexis 2d ed. 2006).
165 RICHARD 0. LEMPERT ET AL., A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
187 (West 2000).
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eight different standards is an invitation for further
parochialism or for the "regression to the mean" principle
to operate when state supreme courts' interpretations of
these diverse standards are factored in to determine the
current array of standards being employed by state criminal
and civil trial judges each year. 166 The twenty-eight
standards lead to state supreme court decisions that further
balkanize the status of the law on this issue, and open the
door for state supreme courts to interpret these diverse
standards based on judicially crafted junk science
heuristics, with an apparent eye to sanctioning admission of
a vast array of convictions against persons accused of
crimes. 167
B. Identifying Possible Reasons for the
Twenty-Eight Standards
What are the possible reasons that account for this
highly balkanized federalism with regard to the use of
convictions to impeach, expert ignorance of this
phenomenon, and the risk of even greater atomization in
the wake of state supreme courts' interpretations of such
disparate rules? First, based on the collective legislative
histories of the state rules, it can be argued that in several
instances history prevailed, rather than policy evaluation,
when the current state standards continued to reflect
Approximately 150,000 trials are conducted each year in the United
States. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision-Making: 45 Years of
Empirical Research on Deliberation Groups, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 622 (2001) (explaining that "regression to the mean" is the statistical
principle that the more trials that test the outcome of a phenomena, the
more likely is it that overall trials that have produced the most extreme
results will be ameliorated by trials that converge the overall result of
all the trials to the mean). See also DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE
166

IN THE LAW:

STANDARDS STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 141

(West 2002).
167 1 document that each of these very significant risks have in
fact
occurred in the decisions of the state supreme courts in a pending
article. See Holley, supra note 2.
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historical assumptions or heuristics.' 68
State rule
proposers, enactors, and reviewers for the most part
followed the course of the federal rule enactors and stuck
with past policies. They demonstrated little concern for
study of the standards and policies
of other states with an
69
eye toward achieving uniformity. 1
Second, state rule proposers, enactors, and
reviewers must have expressly or implicitly concluded that
no national or shared state constitutional provisions
prevented them from making any of the twenty-eight
choices they made. 170 In fact, state supreme courts during
the period of this study made decisions expressly, albeit for
the most part cursorily, holding that neither the
constitutional right of the accused to testify, nor the right of
the accused to an impartial jury, prevented adoption or
application of the standards to admit convictions
to
17 1
impeach challenged in their respective states.
168 See supra notes 10, 128 and accompanying text.
169 With regard to the federal rule's adherence to current policy, see

supra notes 10, 11 and accompanying text. After the enactment of the
federal rule in 1975, the drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
abandoned their rule regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach and substituted the federal rule in the hope that this would
enhance the likelihood of a uniform standard in the states by
encouraging the states to adopt the standards of the federal rule. This
strategy, in light of the findings of the prior section, failed.
10 In Green, 490 U.S. 504, no member of the court made reference to
constitutional concerns in the enactment history of the federal rule. See
also MCCORMICK, supra note 164 § 42 ("The suggestion has been
made that impeachment of the accused by showing prior convictions is
unconstitutional, but to date, no federal or state court has embraced the
suggestion.").
171State v. Busby, 844 P.2d 897, 901 n.7 (Or. 1991). In this case, the
jury convicted the defendant of first degree sexual assault. However,
the defendant did not testify during the trial. On appeal, he alleged that
he did not testify because the trial judge had ruled he could be
impeached with his prior conviction for sexual assault. The defendant
argued that this ruling violated both his constitutional right to testify on
his own behalf and his right to an impartial jury. The Oregon Supreme
Court did make an evaluation of whether the defendant's right under
the state's constitutional provision assuring a right to an impartial jury
was violated. The court concluded that the jury did not hear about the
conviction for the same offense since the accused did not testify.

58

2:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY 297

Third, these same participants in the state rulemaking and review process must have assumed the
existence of, or actually were aware of, and relied upon
empirical or other evidence which proved that at least
conviction records for one or more specific crimes were
relevant to prove a propensity to lie. 172 Fourth, the
participants in the state rule-making and review process
must have been satisfied that the standard they adopted for
admitting convictions to impeach was consistent with other
related evidence rules, policies, and trends. 173 Finally,
participants in the state rule-making and review process
must have been unaware of or ignored empirical or other
evidence which would compel consensus with regard to the
regulating the admission of
appropriate standard for
74
1
impeach.
to
convictions
While history and particularly history-based legal
rules are by definition not necessarily rational or
synonymous with policy, the four other reasons for the
existence of twenty-eight state standards can be evaluated
to determine if they are rational or at least supported by
The next subsection
empirical or other evidence.
undertakes this evaluation.

Therefore, of course, it could not have been prejudiced by that
information. The court asserted that the accused's theory was that
anytime that a jury heard that the defendant was previously convicted
of sexual abuse, and he was currently charged with sexual abuse, it
would convict the accused. The court expressly declined to assume
that the accused was denied an impartial jury. See also State v. Ihnot,
575 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 1998). In Ihnot, the Minnesota Supreme
Court sanctioned this outcome, even when a lower appellate court had
ruled that admitting a same crime conviction, which would prevent the
accused from testifying, violated the defendant's right to testify in his
own defense under both the national and state constitutions.
172See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
173 See infra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
74
1 See infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
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C. Evaluating the Projected Reasons for the
Existence of Twenty-Eight State
Standards Regulating the Admission of
Convictions to Impeach
1. Evaluating Possible Reason One
for Twenty-Eight State
Standards: No National or State
Constitutional Rights Are
Threatened or Injured By the
Choices the States Have Made
The United States Supreme Court has held that the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is a right
incorporated into the basic protection provided by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
therefore is applicable to regulate state jury trial
procedures. 175 A critical element of this right is the
accused's right to an adequate voir dire that gives him a
chance to identify prospective jurors who are actually
partial to conviction or a capital sentence before they are
seated on the petite jury. 17 6
Significantly, given the
eventual findings in this article, the Court has held that the
presence of even a single juror on the petite jury, who
admits or is otherwise proven to be so partial to conviction
because of racial prejudice in a case significantly
implicating racial considerations or to imposing the death
penalty, once the accused is convicted in a capital
punishment case, that she can not decide guilt or innocence
or whether to impose capital punishment based on the
evidence and law presented during the trial, violates the
175 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509
(1971); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961).
176 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729 (authorizing only the trial judge to conduct
voir dire, but allowing the attorneys to request lines of inquiry).
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Due Process Clause. 177 The Court held that the accused
therefore has a right to devote at least a segment of voir
dire specifically to questions asking prospective jurors
about such actual partiality so that such a prospective juror
may be eliminated for cause.' 78 In the case of questioning
prospective jurors about how the introduction of conviction
evidence might influence their eventual verdict vote, voir
dire interrogation is, first, unlikely to result in accurate selfassessments of the likely influence of conviction evidence,
and second, likely to prompt79 the very unfair prejudice it
would be designed to detect. 1
The Court has also held that the right to an impartial
jury requires courts to evaluate two situations in which the
potential for partial petite jurors is significantly increased:
(1) when pre-trial publicity makes it unlikely that the jury
pool will have enough persons who are impartial; and (2)
when the skewing of the jury panel from which the petite
jury is drawn by state law requires or results in the
exclusion of cognizable community groups, such as women
The Court has relied in part on
or racial minorities.'
See infra notes 209-18 (identifying and discussing empirical studies
proving jurors are made partial towards conviction by the introduction
of conviction records ostensibly admitted for impeachment purpose
only); Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728-29, 734 n.8 (stating that the
constitutional measure of a jury is taken by reference to the impartiality
of each, individual juror). At the time of Morgan's trial, Illinois law
provided that the same jury which decided the guilt or innocence of the
accused would also decide whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at
721. See also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188
(1981); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (concluding that
interracial conflict was a significant substantive element of the theory
of the case).
178 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 733 (recognizing that with regard to qualifying
an impartial jury to decide whether the death penalty should be
imposed, it was constitutional for the government to be authorized to
make such a specific inquiry).
179 See infra note 211 (discussing studies documenting that jurors are
made partial towards convicting the accused in the current trial once
prior conviction evidence is introduced ostensibly only to impeach,
even though they often claim that the evidence did not influence their
decision).
180 Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971) (noting that pretrial
177
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empirical evidence from social science studies to find that
the risk of a difference in the deliberation process and
verdicts was real when these groups were excluded. 18 1 The
Court also relied upon statistical evidence to cast doubt on
the rationality of the state's key proffered policy reason for
systematically excluding women from its jury pools. 182 In
this context, the Court characterized the right to an
impartial jury as an essential and fundamental element of
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a fair jury
trial. 183 The Court also held that this right prevents state
law from creating even certain types of significant risk of a
partial juror, and therefore jury. 184
The Court endorsed the idea that the constitutional
right to an impartial jury is violated whenever one or more
jurors are in fact warped by prejudice or biased by any
influence that poisoned their judgment.' 8 5 In a subsequent
section of this article, empirical evidence from social
science studies is presented and discussed to support the
publicity can possibly infect any jury pool, even if the crime charged is
only a misdemeanor). Therefore, the Court held that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's interpretation of its statute creating a per se merit bar
to a claim that pre-trial publicity in a misdemeanor prosecution was
unconstitutional because it created the likelihood that an impartial jury
could not be drawn from a community exposed to such publicity. See
also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (stating that women
jurors can be infected by pre-trial publicity); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972) (noting that "Negroes" can also be affected by pre-trial
publicity).
8 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532 n.12 (citing four studies which found that
women jurors make such differences).
82 Id. at 535 n.17 (explaining Louisiana's reality hypothesis that
women must opt into jury duty because most were needed to be the
center of family home life, including the rearing of young children).
The Court cited U.S. labor statistics in detail to demonstrate that most
women were in the workforce, and that even a significant minority of
woman with children under the age of three were working.
113Id. at 528, 530.
114 Id. at 538 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion
because it did not require any showing that the state policy in fact had
produced a partial jury, or that the accused had been unfairly treated by
the actual jury or injured by unfair prejudice of an all male jury).
185Groppi, 400 U.S. at 511 n.12.
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conclusion that conviction evidence creates a grave risk of
a difference in the deliberation process and verdicts, and
also casts grave doubt on the only asserted reality claim
186
used to justify the admission of convictions to impeach.
Almost all state constitutions have an express
provision guaranteeing a right to an impartial jury, and in
recent years, several state supreme courts have
characterized the right as fundamental, independent of the
national constitutional right, and an independent
component of minimal standards of due process.' 87 A state
supreme court asserted that a right as fundamental as the
right to an impartial jury cannot be compromised by even
the hint of possible bias or prejudice.188 Another state
supreme court recently held that the right to an impartial
jury is so essential to the state's conception of a fair trial
that its violation cannot be deemed harmless error. 189 That
state supreme court asserted that the presence of even one
190
partial juror on the petite jury violates the right.
In addition to the components of the right to an
impartial jury recognized in United States Supreme Court
decisions, recent state supreme court decisions have
recognized various elements of the right, including: (1) the
right to be free of partisan commentary by the trial judge
during the course of the trial; (2) the right to review
accompanying text.
State v. McDougal and Ruffm, 699 A.2d 872, 881 (Conn.1997)
(asserting that a state constitutional right was independent of a federal
constitutional right); People v. Olinger, 680 N.E.2d 321, 335 (Ill.
1997); Jenkins v. State, 825 A.2d 1008, 1017 (Md. 2003) (holding that
the right to an impartial jury is one of the most fundamental rights
under both the federal and Maryland constitutions); State v. Rhines,
548 N.W.2d 415, 430 (S.D. 1996); State v. Davis, 10 P.3d 977, 994
(Wash. 2000) (recognizing an independent due process component).
88 Jenkins, 825 A.2d at 1028-29 (explaining that an improper contact
by a single juror with a prosecution-police officer witness may
constitute unfair bias or prejudice).
189 State v. Herman, 70 P.3d 738, 742 (Mt. 2003).
190 Id. (evaluating whether the accused received ineffective assistance
of counsel by not adequately pursuing disqualifying potentially partial
jurors during voir dire).
186 See infra notes 196-98, 209-18 and
187
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whether a prospective juror was partial and lied to prevent
disclosure of the basis of the partiality during voir dire; and
(3) the right to review whether there was deliberate,
prejudicial contact and conversations between a juror and a
prosecution witness. 19 1 In summation, the national and
state constitutions guarantee the right of the accused to an
impartial jury, a right that the national and state supreme
courts have characterized as fundamental.
Some of the current components of the right were
established by reliance in part on empirical evidence. The
right, as stated in the constitutions and restated by the
courts, does not contain an exception for persons who were
previously convicted of a crime prior to their current jury
trial. Hence, the first reason, of the possible four plausible
reasons for twenty-eight state standards-most of which
admit in some form convictions to impeach-is not reality.
At least two fundamental constitutional rights are arguably
injured by the willy-nilly admission of convictions to
impeach.
2. Evaluating Possible Reason Two
for Twenty-Eight State
Standards: A Criminal
Conviction Record is Relevant
Proof of a Propensity to Lie
The fundamental admissibility requirement for all
evidence is that it must be relevant to prove or disprove the

191State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024, 1043 (Conn. 2003) (concluding
that commentary during trial deprives defendants of the very essence of

their constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and holding
that jury instructions were not partisan); Olinger, 680 N.E.2d at 335
(stating that a juror who lied during voir dire to avoid disclosure of
partiality, provides a basis for a new trial if the lie is revealed after the
trial); Jenkins, 825 A.2d at 1017-18 (criticizing juror and police
prosecution witness for attending retreat together and having multiple
conversations)
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issue for which the proponent offers it. 192 There is a
universal consensus that no legislature, court, or judge
should, by flat, be able to override this most fundamental of
evidence admissibility rules.' 93 The consensus is based on
the logic that admitting irrelevant evidence is irrational.
Consequently, the proponent of any item of evidence must
be able to first prove that the item has the probability of
being a fact, and second, that the fact has the probability of
actually helping prove her theory of the case, or disproving
her opponent's. A record of conviction of a crime is a
provable fact, but there is no evidence that it has the
probability of proving that the person whose credibility is
FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding all irrelevant evidence). Most states
have an express rule comparable to this federal rule. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90-402 (LexisNexis 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-2
(2004); HAW. R. EVID. 402; IND. R. EVID. 402 (2004); LA. CODE EvID.
ANN. art. 402 (2004); MD. R. EvID. 5-402.
193 FED. R. EVID 103 (requiring the proponent of evidence to prove its
admissibility by showing that there is at least a possibility that the
evidence is factually what the proponent purports it to be, and that there
is at least a possibility that the evidence assists her theory of the case or
hurts that of the opposing party). In Green v. Bock Laundry, the
Supreme Court asserted that Congress had the authority to abrogate the
presumptive applicability of the overall rule's general balancing
requirement prior to admission embodied in FED. R. EVID. 403. Hence,
exclusionary policies identified in that balancing rule need not be
considered. But what the United States Supreme Court did not and
could not assert is that Congress has authority to authorize the
admission of irrelevant evidence. First, Congress in FED. R. EvID. 402
expressly asserted that all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Even if
that provision was not adopted, however, no legislative authority has
the power to declare the world is flat, and hence all logical
consequences that flow there from when a litigant can show they could
help prove her case or disprove her opponent's case are admissible. In
other words, Congress has the authority to subordinate the generic
requirement of policy evaluation prior to admissibility, to a rule
requiring per se admission, but only of relevant evidence. In federal
rule terms, FED. R. EVID. 403 can be subordinated by Congress, but not
FED. R. EvID. 401 and FED. R. EVID. 402. Id. at 524-26. See also
Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information ProcessingAnd
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L. & SOC. REv. 123, 156 (1980)
(stating that the legal system will better employ base line probabilities
and other empirical evidence to learn that truth is not merely anything a
court asserts).
192
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attacked has a greater propensity to lie.' 94 If, on the other
hand, there is proof that the conduct that was the basis for
the conviction included lying under oath, in legal
documents, or in other serious settings and is therefore
relevant to prove, if not propensity, at least demonstrated
willingness to lie in situations comparable to testifying,
there is still no rational reason to refer to the conviction,
95
and that conduct may be the basis for cross-examination. 1
The historical heuristic, which is the longest historical
proffered "proof' of this reality hypothesis-that
194 Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Krishenbaum, Some Empirical
Evidence on the Effect of S. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an
Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 88-89 (1973). The section of the Canadian
Evidence Code refereed to in the title of this article was to that
country's version of a rule, which, like FED. R. EvID. 609, authorized
the admission of convictions to impeach. The article's authors
immediately noted that the first premise of such a provision is that
persons who commit crimes are more likely to have a propensity to lie.
Making reference to an article that reviewed thirty-five years of
research on this subject, the authors paraphrased the article's finding
that little or no evidence existed to support such an assumption. For
example, the authors asserted that the data indicated that a person who
would be likely to steal something in one situation would not be more
likely to tell lies in a second situation than would someone who would
not steal in the first instance. In the following discussion, infra notes
196-98, 209-17, this article documents that in the three decades since
this study, the empirical and other evidence continues to provide no
basis to establish that this assumption has a probability of being reality.
195 FED. R. EVID. 609, advisory committee's notes (beginning with the
acknowledgement that the fact of a conviction of a crime is itself
irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie). The note asserts that the
conviction's actual function is proof. Id. But proof of what? Proof
that, in fact, the witness engaged in conduct with the requisite
culpability, under circumstances, and with possible results that which
by element analysis alone, or by reference to the specific facts is logical
evidence of propensity to lie. See also infra note 210 (reporting on
confirming empirical evidence of the intuition that jurors will be highly
skeptical of the truth of the testimony of any criminal defendant); infra
note 260 (demonstrating that while many jurisdictions, including the
federal rule, currently ban employment of extrinsic evidence to prove
such specific conduct, given the existence of record evidence, a rule
could be crafted to obtain a judicial admission of the conduct prior to
trial, which would only be admitted, if for some bizarre reason, the
witness on the stand denied the underlying conduct relevant to prove
propensity to lie).
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disobedience to law is logical evidence of a greater
propensity to lie-is "junk science" at its worst. 196 There is
not a shred of empirical evidence to support this inference,
197
and the evidence that does exist is to the contrary.
196 There are sociological empirical studies which have found, for
example, that over the course of several years, youths who self-report
that they drink excessively also report that they use contraband drugs,
engage in crime, and drive dangerously all more frequently than do
members of their peer group at the same time. D. Wayne Osgood et al.,
The Generality of Deviance in Late Adolescence and Early Adulthood,
53 AM. Soc. REV. 81 (1988). These studies did not even purport to link
such anti-social behavior to greater frequency of lying. Indeed, the
very premise of such a self-reporting study is that all subjects must be
deemed as equally as likely to be telling the truth when they self-report.
It is possible to find disciples of almost any "junk science" proposition
including this proposition. See SAMUEL YOCHELSON & STANTON E.
SAMENOW, la CRIMINAL PERSONALITY 348-57 (Aronson, Inc. 1976).

The authors were talking about their definition of "criminals." Their
definition was psychological, and broader than persons who were
convicted of crime. The authors began with a self-damming universal
assertion, that "without exception," lying is incorporated into every
criminal's basic make-up and is a nutrient of criminal patterns." Id. at
348. As authority for this proposition, the only authority cited was a
1915 publication, which was a study of pathological liars and could be
taken as supporting by inference that such persons also engaged in
other anti-social behavior. See WILLIAM HEALY & MARY T. HEALY,
PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION, AND SWINDLING (Little Brown
1915). The reciprocal, but obviously not necessarily logical inference,
that those who engage in anti-social behavior are therefore more likely
to be liars. Thereafter the authors make a multitude of universal
statements about criminals as liars.
197J.A. BARNES, A PACK OF LIES 148, 165, 167 (Cambridge Univ.

Press 1994) (explaining that lying in humans is ubiquitous, ancient, and
diverse, and that there is a lack of any empirical evidence proving that
any particular behaviors or character traits increase or decrease
propensity to lie). The author also calls for more empirical research on
lying. Id. See also Allen A. Bartholomew, PsychiatricEvaluation of
Lying, THE AUSTRALIAN J. OF FORENSIC SCI., 174, June, 1983, at 184-

185 (citing a lack of experts and a lack of empirical or other reliable
evidence to credibly identify personality traits or behaviors as
indicators of lying and liars). The article hypothesizes that law
provides no answers to a prove propensity to lie. Id. It also provides
that neither religious study, nor psychiatry proves a propensity to liethe kind of empirical research suggested in some of the reported
studies. One kind of study that is needed is that in which lying under
controlled experimental conditions is tested. See, e.g., Michael Lewis,

The Development of Deception, in LYING AND DECEPTION IN
EVERYDAY LIFE (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saami eds., Guilford Press
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Judges, evidence rule writers, legal commentators, and
participants in empirical research have admitted that the
mere existence of a criminal record is irrelevant to prove a
propensity to lie. 198 The admission of convictions to prove
a propensity to lie, when records of a criminal conviction
are irrelevant to prove a propensity to lie, should also be
held to violate both the constitutional rights of an accused
to an impartial jury, as well as the right of all litigants to
due process. Legislatures and supreme courts lack a
rational basis to justify risking substantial injury to the
liberty and property interests of the accused and the
1993). Controlled studies reported in this anthology provide a basis for
gathering comparative demographic data on the subjects, and the
correlation of that data to whether the subject lied. The reported
controlled studies of lying by children, for example, indicated that.
children of lower IQ were significantly less likely to lie than children
with higher IQs. Such a finding is in conflict with the idea reflected in
the traditional rule allowing felony convictions to impeach that persons
convicted of a felony, a group with a lower average IQ than the
population as a whole, has a greater propensity to lie. Id. at 98. More
studies of adults are needed to determine if this pattern continues as
children mature. Studies that have been conducted on lying by adults,
have produced findings that some persons lie more easily and with
greater success, but most significantly for the rule that authorizes
convictions to impeach on the premise they prove propensity to lie, is
that these persons did not differ from other people on their scores on
objective personality tests. Hence, the studies indicate that there is no
evidence to support the rule's premise that measurable personality traits
or behaviors signal a greater likelihood of lying. Paul Ekman, & Mark

G. Frank, Lies that Fail, in LYING

AND DECEPTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE

188-89 (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saami eds., Guilford Press 1993).
198 FED. R. EVID. 609, advisory committee note (beginning with the
acknowledgement that the fact of a conviction of a crime is itself
irrelevant as proof of a propensity to lie); Green, 490 U.S. at 509 n.4
(noting that for almost one hundred years, including after the enactment
of the federal rule in 1975, multiple commentators, including Justice
Holmes, questioned the relevance of a conviction as proof of a
propensity to lie. See also supra note 1 (discussing critical views of
commentators including those whose views included great skepticism
of whether there was any evidence that records of convictions generally
were relevant to prove propensity to lie); supra note 43 (endorsing the
Montana rules whose drafters expressly acknowledged that convictions
are irrelevant for this purpose); infra note 206 (discussing empirical
studies which have included findings that simulated jurors and juries do
not regard conviction records as proof of a propensity to lie).
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99

property interest of other litigants.'
Because convictions are irrelevant to prove
propensity to lie, their admission for that purpose violates
this most basic evidence admissibility requirement.
Therefore, the second reason of the four evidence-based
199 See discussion supra note 185 and accompanying text. In making
an evaluation of an alleged injury to the right of an accused to an
impartial jury, the court evaluated the proffered rational basis of the
With regard to substantive due process, the
challenged statute.
consensus of scholars and court opinions agree that even when
maximum respect is paid to the principal of judicial restraint,
legislation is reviewable to determine if it at least has a rational relation
to a legitimate governmental interest. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 447-59
(West 2004) (discussing the evolution of substantive due process);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the Court
noted:
Legislation whose only purpose is vindication of the particular
moral code, beliefs, or interests of a segment of the population
may not be a legitimate government goal, particularly when it
injures or significantly risk injury to the liberty interests of those
who are not members of that segment of the population ...
History and tradition are the starting point but not necessarily
ending point of substantive due process evaluations.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72. For a recent state supreme court
decision endorsing the same standard for state as well as the federal
constitution's substantive due process protection, see Caviglia v. Royal
Tours of America, 842 A.2d 125 (N.J. 2004). In Caviglia, the court
observed that
A legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and the
burden is on those challenging the legislation to show that it lacks
a rational basis. . . . The State, however, was not obligated to
present statistical evidence to prove the soundness of the
legislation. In the absence of a "sufficient showing" that the
legislature lacked factual support for its judgment, this Court will
assume that the statute is based on "some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the Legislature."
Id. at 134-35. With regard to the risk of substantial injury to property
interests that can result from the admission of convictions to impeach in
civil cases, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; see also infra
notes 227-32 for a more detailed argument that it is unconstitutional to
admit records of conviction to impeach.

69

2:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW

&

POLICY

308

hypothesized reasons for the twenty-eight state standardsmost of which admit in some form convictions to
impeach-is not reality.
3. Evaluating Possible Reason
Three for The Twenty-Eight
Standards: Multiple Standards
are Consistent with Other
Evidence Rules, Policies, and
Trends
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that
judges should prohibit the use of so called "junk science"
as the basis for "authenticating" an expert, as well as the
methods, instrumentalities, and studies relied upon by
persons who do qualify as experts. 200 Hence, even an
200

Daubert v. Merrill Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (citing the relevance

rule, FED. R. EvID. 401, along with FED. R. EvID. 403 and FED. R.
EVID. 702). The Court held that this sequence of admission standards
gave judges sufficient discretion to determine if experts were experts,
and whether the scientific and technical innovation and "well
established" theories or methods warrant admission to assist the trier of
fact by looking at its likelihood of providing such assistance. The
Court noted that the exclusionary policies implicated must also be
evaluated. The degree to which the instrumentalities or methods
employed by the person as the basis of her expert opinion were
"established" in that person's field of expertise, particularly for the use
for which they were employed by the person testifying, was an element
in that evaluation. The Court went on to identify a non-exhaustive list
of factors to evaluate, under the rubric of the exclusionary policy of
reliability, but that exclusionary policy under the present evidence rule
scheme is the sole basis for excluding evidence when there is a
significant risk of evidence fabrication.
The majority opinion in
Daubert pointed to the fundamental requirement to qualify as "science"
that the theory, hypotheses, instrumentality, or method and its use and
the resulting data is testable and has in fact been tested. In addition, the
Court identified whether the theory, instrumentality, or methodology
was previously published and peer reviewed in appropriate
publications. The Court also identified as an evaluation factor, if there
are required governmental or non-governmental reviewing agencies,
whether appropriate governmental and private agencies have conducted
such reviews, have reached favorable conclusions, and that the
instrumentality or methodology has successfully passed one or more
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acknowledged expert's basis for testifying must be proven
by the proponent of the expert to have the possibility of
being fact. 2° 1 Commentators reflecting on the significance
of Daubert and its progeny, have viewed its primary
directive to judges is to take more care in determining that
the reality hypothesis and its basis offered by a person
seeking to testify as an expert are more likely fact than
fiction. Or, in basic evidence law policy terms, that the
reality hypotheses with regard to the expert and her
instrumentalities, as employed in the proponent's theory of
the case, have a realistic chance of being and doing what
2 2
0
the proponent of the evidence says they are and can do.
Thus understood, scrutinizing science to root out "junk
science" is not simply a mantra for well-heeled defense
attorneys working for well-heeled clients in tort litigation,
but simply a subset of the general evidence law core
concern that neither individual case decisions nor
eventually the policy reflected cumulatively in decisional
law be based on reality hypotheses-in legal profession
parlance-theory of the case-that are not provable as fact;
i.e., are contra to fact, or at odds with the empirical
steps towards approval by the appropriate regulatory agency.
20 1 Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics, Biases and the Importance of
Gatekeeping, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 987, 990-91 (2003) (evaluating

the significance of Daubert with regard to the appropriate role of the
judge as gatekeeper). According to Beecher-Monas,

This framework for justice is the inspiration for the rules of
evidence, and a fundamental tenet is that only facts having
relevance-rational probative value should be admissible in the
search for truth. . . . Although the meanings of truth and

rationality are subject to debate in an open society, ultimately
truth is empirical, and what we understand as rationality consists
of structured

reasoning

process relating

perception

to

an

explanation about how the world works.
Id. at 990-91.
See David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific
202 Id. at 1001.
Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the Law's Use of Experts
in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 661, 672-73
(2000).
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evidence required to establish2 as
fact(s) the assumptions or
3
0
therein.
contained
allegations

Decades before Daubert, social scientists, working
with lawyers, produced empirical evidence whose import
was used as proof that several evidence rules were based
upon anti-science or "junk science"; their policy premises
were not reality. 204 At a recent national symposium
entitled "Visions of Rationality in Evidence Law," several
evidence scholars critiqued certain current exclusionary
rules by focusing on whether there was empirical or other
evidence to support the premise that the evidence targeted
for exclusion would prompt juror decision making on
Commentators reviewing aspects of the impact of Daubert and its
progeny on federal court decisions have concluded that it has resulted
in more frequent exclusions of at least certain experts and expert
evidence. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 202 at 667-68 (identifying
more frequent exclusion of prosecution proffered experts seeking to
qualify primarily on experience).
These commentators' views,
however, were not apparently based on a systematic study of how these
experts and this expert evidence fared in all cases in all federal courts
since the Daubert decision. Studies of outcomes, based on federal and
state appellate decisions, concluded that there was not a significant
difference in the admission of expert testimony in criminal cases, in the
five and one-half years following the Daubert decision, when
compared to the five and one-half year period proceeding Daubert.
Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert On The Admissibility
of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 339 345 (2002) ("basic rates of admission of expert
testimony at the trial and appellate court levels did not change
significantly after Daubert in criminal cases"). In addition, surveys of
federal trial judges indicated that more rather than fewer experts
testified per trial in 1998 than testified in 1991. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic
& Valerie P. Hans, Jurors' Evaluation of Expert Testimony: Judging
203

the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 444

2003).
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First

0

Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1, 12 (2002).

This series of

articles included three which questioned the assumptions underlying
evidence rules regulating consciousness of guilt, competency of
witnesses, and spontaneous exclamations. Id. at n.73. Dr. Blumenthal
cited to other authors who had asserted that the collaborative effort of
these authors failed to have the impact that the authors apparently
sought-experimental testing of the assumptions underlying those rules
and possible reform in light of the results of that test. Id.
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irrational bases.2 °5 With due respect to the conference
participants; however, the more fundamental rationality
issue with regard to evidence rules was not nearly as central
to the discussion. That issue is whether there is empirical
or other actual proof that current evidence rules that
authorize admission, including the rule authorizing
20 6
convictions to impeach, can pass this fundamental test.
Other commentators have endorsed the exclusion of
character evidence or any evidence based on predicting
litigation behavior by reference to prior supposedly similar
or analogous conduct as "junk science." 207 Surely in 2005,
state evidence rule makers and state supreme courts should
hold their own heuristic hunches, which serve as the sole
basis for asserting that an enactment authorizing admission
of evidence is relevant, to the same scrutiny; i.e., 20to8
evaluate if that heuristic is simply "junk science".
205

Visions of Rationality in Evidence Law Symposium, 2003 MICH. ST.

L. REv. 837-1364. See also Eleanor Swift, Aspirational Optimism
About Evidence Law: An Implicit Theme of the Visions of Rationality
Symposium, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1337, 1348 (summarizing

elements of the symposium by categorizing seven of the articles
focused on evaluating the rationality of exclusionary evidence rules).
206 See discussion supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
207 Beecher-Monas, supra note 201, at 1003, 1004, 1017-19 (illustrating
how future dangerousness predictions should be carefully evaluated for
likelihood of accuracy before admission because irrelevant evidence
dilutes relevant evidence); Saks & Kidd, supra note 193, at 136
(observing that, based on the law of probabilities, evidence law is
correct in excluding character evidence as proof of the theories of a
party's case).
2
It should be noted, however, that in the fifteen year period of this
study, 1990-2004, while state supreme courts made over two hundred
decisions evaluating whether state legislation had a rational basis to
defeat a substantive due process challenge, in none of these decisions
did they refer to "empirical evidence" or "legislative facts," and only
one of these decisions made reference to the "Brandeis Brief."
Alabama Power Co. v. Citizens of State, 740 So. 2d 371, 382 n. 11 (Ala.
1999). Overall, during this period, only eighteen state supreme court
decisions made express reference to all three concepts: (1) rational
basis, (2) empirical evidence or data, and (3) legislative fact. With
regard to state constitutional substantive due process provisions, see
Helen Hershkoff, PositiveRights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review 112 HARv. L. REv. 1131, 1136-38 (1999)
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Therefore, the third reason of the four possible reasons for
twenty-eight state standards, most of which admit in some
form convictions to impeach, is also invalid.
This
admission rule is inconsistent with one of the most
significant evidence law trends--closer scrutiny of reality
hypotheses claims that serve as justification for admitting
or excluding evidence.
The constitutional and policy case against admitting
convictions to impeach is further strengthened if upon
review of the available empirical evidence, it is determined
that jurors and simulated jurors do regard conviction
records as irrelevant for credibility purposes. The case is
even stronger if the empirical evidence also supports a
finding that the admission of a conviction record to
impeach creates a significant risk that the subsequent civil
or criminal verdict will be the product of the deliberation
and vote of one or more partial jurors. This article next
examines this evidence as possible rational reason number
(discussing Thayer's view that a rationality review reflects a judicial
posture that the constitution does not impose a particular choice on the
legislature, but only that the choice reflected in the statute is rational).
But Professor Hershkoff also referred to Justice Stevens' comment that
rational basis standard has in effect no review at all. Id. at 1136.
Neither reference, however, included a consensus definition of the term
"rational" in this context. Id. at 1136-37. Professor Hershkoff
proposed that state supreme courts should provide closer scrutiny of
state legislative enactments to determine more than if they are just
rational under some possible scenario, but whether the enactments have
minimally protected express state rights. Id. at 1137. While Professor
Hershkoff s focus was on express state welfare rights, her advocacy
would equally apply to the fact that most state constitutions expressly
recognize a right to an impartial jury. Id. See also Randall T. Shepard,
A New Generation: The Maturing Nature of State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 421, 441 (1996) (identifying
fundamental differences between the states and the federal constitution
that justify closer state supreme court scrutiny of the rational basis and
reality hypotheses underlying state legislative enactments); Sandra J.
Ware, Developments in State ConstitutionalLaw: 1996, 28 RUTGERS
L.J. 909, 1003 (1997) (identifying a state supreme court decision which
struck down a state drunk driving statute as violative of due process in
part because the statute's reality premise was faulty when it did not
require proof that the accused was intoxicated during the time he was
driving).
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four for admitting convictions to impeach, and for the

existence of twenty-eight different standards in the states,
all but one authorizing such admission.
4. Evaluating Possible Reason Four
for Twenty-Eight State
Standards: No Empirical
Evidence Exists to Support
Consensus with Regard to the

Appropriate Standard for
Regulating the Admission of
Convictions to Impeach
Studies of actual jury behavior, as well as studies of
simulated juror reaction to the introduction of conviction
evidence of the accused, have almost universally reported
two findings highly relevant to this study. First, jurors
simply do not believe or act upon a belief that conviction
records, even perjury conviction records, are proof that
such convicted persons have a greater propensity to lie.2 °9
209 Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act and the Deliberationsof Simulated Juries, 18 Crim. L.Q.
235, 247 (1976) (noting that "juries" who were informed of the prior
conviction were not significantly more likely to even make reference to
the credibility of the accused). Ironically, in these studies, the only
time prior conviction disclosure influenced jurors to significantly doubt
the accused's credibility was when the conviction's specific purpose
admission was not for that purpose, but as substantive proof of guilt.
See also Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of PriorRecord
Evidence on JurorDecision Making, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 75-76
(1995) (indicating when directly asked, mock jurors did not believe the
prior conviction evidence was probative on the only issue for which it
Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard
was admissible);
Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 407, 415 (1995) (hypothesizing that the credibility of the
accused is not significantly negatively effected in the views of the
subjects of the study, even when the prior conviction was for perjury
and was admitted in one of four scenarios in the study); Roselle L.
Wissler & Michael L. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions:
When Jurors Use CredibilityEvidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 L. & HuM.
BEHAV. 37, 41 (1985) (stating that although forty of one hundred sixty
subjects were told that accused has a prior conviction for pejury, and
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On the other hand, as most trial lawyers would agree based
on their experience and as an intelligent lay person might
surmise, jurors are inherently skeptical of the credibility of
the accused whether or not a prior conviction of the
accused is introduced to impeach him.210
Second, juror studies provide highly probative
evidence that jurors and juries do, whether they
acknowledge it or not, use prior conviction evidence to
prejudice their substantive evaluation of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.2 1'
Each study's findings
that the conviction could be used only to evaluate the credibility of the
accused who testified, these subjects did not find the accused
significantly less credible than those subjects told he had been
convicted of two other crimes). Even more significantly, the subjects
with knowledge of a perjury conviction did not find the accused
significantly less credible than did those subjects who received no
information that the accused had been previously convicted of any
crime). Id.
210 Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 41. The subjects across all eight
conditions, including those control conditions when the subjects were
not informed of a prior conviction, rated the credibility of the accused
as significantly lower than that of all of the other witnesses. Id. The
strength of this across the board finding was more than enough to
satisfy the basic evidence standard of relevance. Id. In fact, the
strength of this finding, when translated into evidence law proof
terminology, was that it had probative value well beyond the relevance
threshold in establishing that it is reality that jurors are inherently
skeptical of the likelihood an accused will tell the truth should he
testify in his own defense. Id.
211 Doob & Krishenbaum, supra note 194, at 93-94 (presenting seven
convictions, including five convictions for the identical crime as the
charge being currently tried, which were admitted to certain "cells" of
the entire test group). Some "cells" were control groups who did not
learn of the convictions. The strength of the findings of this study were
far more than enough to satisfy the basic evidence standard of
relevance-heightening the probability that in reality jurors learning of
convictions of the accused, ostensibly only to impeach the accused, are
much more likely to return guilty verdicts than jurors who do not learn
of convictions to impeach. See Greene & Dodge, supra note 209, at 67,
75-76 (explaining that individual simulated jurors were significantly
albeit unwittingly influenced to return a guilty verdict by exposure to a
prior conviction, when they were told it was substantively admissible
for a limited purpose). These jurors self-assessment was that they did
not allow the prior conviction to influence their verdict. The strength
of the study's key finding, however, was far more than enough to
satisfy the basic evidence standard of relevance-heightening the
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sufficiently rejected the hypothesis that the admission of
conviction to impeach the accused would not influence
individual or collective juror verdicts to satisfy the basic
the
of relevance-heightening
evidence standard
by
prejudiced
unfairly
are
jurors
in
reality,
that,
probability
the admission of convictions, ostensibly only to impeach.
The studies prove that simulated and actual jurors provided
with prior conviction information will, at a rate of
difference fairly characterized as probative on this issue,
more frequently return guilty verdicts than jurors reviewing
exactly the same case under exactly the same conditions
who did not receive such information. 2 12 Several of these
studies either obtained data from jurors and other sources
of evidence after actual jury deliberation and verdicts, or
included simulation of the jury deliberation phase of the
trial.213 These studies lessen concern about "external
probability that in reality jurors learning of convictions of the accused
for this limited purpose were more likely to return a guilty verdict than
jurors who did not learn of the conviction, when all other circumstances
were identical); Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at 242, 249 (explaining
again that study group members overwhelmingly agreed the prior
conviction had not influenced their evaluation of the evidence to prove
guilt or innocence, or their individual or collective verdicts). The
strength of the study's key finding, however, was far more than enough
to satisfy the basic evidence standard of relevance-heightening the
probability that in reality jurors are unfairly prejudiced by the
admission of even a single same crime conviction, ostensibly only to
impeach. The study proved that such jurors will more frequently return
guilty verdicts than jurors reviewing exactly the same case who did not
receive information of convictions to impeach the accused. Id. at 242.
See also Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 36 (reviewing study of the
performance of actual juries and concluding that introduction of the
prior record of the accused for any purpose increased the likelihood of
conviction by 27%); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making
Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 L. & Soc. REv. 781, 792-93 (1978)
(studying over two hundred actual jury verdicts in criminal felony cases
and finding that defendants, who during their trial had multiple
convictions admitted were more likely to be convicted); Wissler and
Saks, supra note 209, at 41-42.
212 Doob & Krishenbaum supra note 194, at 93-94 (1973); Greene &
Dodge, supra note 209, at 67, 76; Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at
251; Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 42.
213 Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at 242-43, 251. The study included a
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validity," and thereby enhance the probative value of the
studies collectively as proof that convictions cause
prejudice. 214 The simulation study found that the "fact that
the defendant has a record permeate[d] the entire discussion
of the case, and appeare[d] to affect the [jury's]
perception
' 21 5
and interpretation of the evidence in the case. "
In one study, convictions for the same crime as that
for which the accused was on trial were found to even more
significantly influence subjects to find the defendant
total of thirty, four person juries, and forty individual simulated jurors.
This meant that fifteen groups and twenty individuals received
information about the prior conviction. The other half of the test
subjects, were given the exact same "transcript," except the prior
conviction was omitted. All thirty of the four person jury deliberation
discussions were tape recorded. While the prior record did not
significantly affect the verdicts reached by individuals, none of the
fifteen simulated juries who were not informed of the prior record of
the accused returned guilty verdicts, while six of the fifteen juries who
were given this information returned guilty verdicts. Kalven & Zeisel,
supra note 36; Myers, supra note 211, at 792-93. For a mega-study
purporting to identify and categorizing all jury deliberation studies
between 1955-1999, see Devine et al., supra note 166 (identifying and
describing over 200 empirical studies of various facets of jury
deliberation during this forty-five year period).
214 FAIGMAN ET AL.,

supra note 166, at 143-44 (identifying external

validity based on the ability to generalize the findings of a study, and
differences that could make generalization debatable). As shown in the
studies cited in this sub-section, this study also identified replication of
the same or similar findings by multiple studies, especially if the
studies employed multiple, sound methodologies. See also Nancy J.
King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the
Effects of JurorRace on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REv. 63 (1993)
(commenting that there is little agreement about whether and how the
absence of a deliberation component, or other factors present in actual
jury decision making processes, actually skew results of jury studies
that do not include such components).
215 Hans & Doob, supra note 209, at 244, 251 (showing
that the
analysis of the taped deliberations revealed that the "juries" who were
informed of the prior conviction were significantly more likely to
characterize the identical evidence as strong proof of guilt, while the
"juries" who did not learn of the prior record were significantly more
likely to make more frequent disparaging statements about the case
against the accused). Hans and Doob note that "juries" who learned of
the prior conviction also made more references to those items of
evidence supporting a guilty verdict.
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guilty. 2 16 Subjects of these studies were less likely to use

information that the accused had a prior conviction of a
comparatively minor crime to increase the likelihood of
returning a guilty verdict for a much more serious crime,
such as murder.217 Convictions have the effect of creating
partial jurors and biasing the jury deliberation process, even
when the subjects of some of these studies knew it was not
to be used to decide the outcome, and in those studies in
expressly told that such use was
which they were
2 18
impermissible.

Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 42 (noting that convictions for
murder and for auto theft in current murder and auto theft trials
significantly increased verdicts of guilty beyond the significant increase
that resulted when subjects were told of convictions for a dissimilar
crime or perjury).
217/d. at 44 (showing that subjects who were informed that a defendant
on trial for murder had a prior conviction for auto theft returned guilty
verdicts at a lesser rate than those subjects who evaluated the murder
prosecution without access to any prior record information). On the
other hand, Wissler and Saks acknowledge that when subjects
evaluating the merits of an auto theft prosecution were informed that
the accused had a prior conviction for murder, the percentage of guilty
verdicts doubled from the percentage of guilty verdicts returned when
the auto theft "jurors" received no prior record information.
218 Doob & Krishenbaum, supra note 194, at 94-95 (concluding that
despite being told in the very last instruction that the seven prior
convictions were to be used only to evaluate the credibility of the
accused who testified in the defense-case-in-chief, subjects were
significantly more likely to convict than those subjects who did not
know of the convictions, and just as likely to convict as those subjects
who knew of the convictions but were not given the limiting
instruction); Greene & Dodge, supra note 209, at 67, 76 (giving no
significance to the limiting instruction when the matter disclosed to
jurors was the conviction of the accused or the witness). Other studies
using simulated jurors also found that subjects often ignore a ruling that
evidence is inadmissible or a limiting instruction that certain evidence
should not be used to decide the merits, and still use such evidence as
part of their basis for reaching a verdict. See, e.g., Hans & Doob, supra
note 209, at 237, 240 (reflecting on a study in which one-half of the
study's subjects who received information about a single same crime
conviction were expressly instructed not to use the conviction of the
accused to determine guilt or innocence, and were also told that the
only permissible use of the conviction was to impeach the testimony of
the accused who did take the stand). Other studies, focusing more
broadly on the effect of inadmissible evidence have reached similar
conclusions. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 209, at 44 (noting
216
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The collective findings of these studies far exceed
the slight increase in probabilities that satisfies the law's
basic evidence relevance standard, which means that there
is empirical evidence that in fact supports two crucial
conclusions: first, lay persons eligible to serve as jurors
join the chorus that criminal conviction records are
irrelevant to prove propensity to lie; second, there is a
significant risk that individual jurors and the jury will be
partial if exposed to a prior conviction of the accused, and
will be more likely to convict such a person on a basis other
than the specific facts of the current prosecution. Hence,
this fourth possible reason for twenty-eight state standards,
almost all of which authorize in some form convictions to
impeach, is not reality based.
Is the quantitative and qualitative empirical
evidence, as discussed in this and previous subsections of
this article, sufficient to serve as a significant component of
the basis for finding that the admission of a prior conviction
to prove propensity to lie violates the right to an impartial
jury and due process? This article returns to and completes
this evaluation in the next subsection.

that all subjects who received information that the accused had a prior
conviction were all instructed to use that information only to evaluate
the credibility of the accused, but a majority of the subjects admitted
that the conviction influenced their verdict); Sharon Wolf and David
Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial
Admonishment to Disregardon the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205 (1977). These and several other studies
are noted and their most crucial findings discussed in the literature
review section of Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding
The Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social PsychologicalExplanations
for the Failuresof Instructions to Disregardand PretrialPublicity and
OtherInadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677, 686-88
(2000). These authors summarize their review of prior studies on the

effect of limiting instructions with regard to both substantive
admissibility use restrictions, and use for impeachment purposes only
instructions, by concluding "that with few exceptions, empirical
research has repeatedly demonstrated that both types of limiting
instructions are unsuccessful at controlling juror cognitive processes."
Id. at 686.
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5. If There is No Valid Reason for
Admitting Convictions to
Impeach, Is the Contra
Evidence, Especially the Contra
Empirical Evidence, and the
Law's Heightened Scrutiny of
Admitting Evidence Based on
Junk Science Enough to Support
a Finding that the Admission of
Records of Convictions to
Impeach is Both Poor Policy and
Unconstitutional?
For the better part of the last one hundred years, the
United States Supreme Court has intermittently relied upon
empirical evidence as a significant component of its basis
for recognizing, expanding, or even devolving several
constitutional rights, or to evaluate whether there was a
rational basis for legislation which arguably infringed upon
a constitutional right. 2 19 The Court has also sanctioned the
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730 (1997) (finding
complete ban on assisting suicides to be rational because of statistical
evidence that suicides are a serious public health problem, and that a
large proportion of suicides are suffering from a serious mental illness
at the time they take their lives); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
412 (1997) (characterizing Fourth Amendment liberty interests of all
people who are passengers in motor vehicles as de minimis and
subordinate to the interests of the government in protecting police who
legally stop such vehicles). The Court established significant state
interests by relying on statistics of number about the number of injuries
to police officers inflicted during such stops, despite the express
acknowledgement by the majority that the empirical data on such
injuries was fairly characterized as "sparse." Id. at 413, n.2. See Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992) (interpreting the First
Amendment Establishment Clause to protect junior and senior high
school children from choosing between their religious beliefs and
participation while attending graduation ceremonies in which the state
authorized prayer and requested participation of all attendees). In Lee,
the Court relied on three social science studies to support its evaluation
that teens who did not want to participate in the state prayer would feel
pressured to do so by their peers. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
219
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use of empirical evidence to evaluate if a proffered rational
basis for legislation is reality, and hence can survive a
claim that the legislation is irrational, or even if rational, is
not protective of so strong a state interest that it can justify
the injury it inflicts or threatens to a national constitutional
right. 220 The Court has also established and restated
several times the principle that when legislation infringes
upon a specific right recognized in the Constitution, or
specific liberty interests identified by the Court in its
substantive due process jurisprudence, the quantum of
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial
scrutiny of such an enactment will vary up or down with
the novelty and plausibility of the justifications offered in
support of the legislation.22I As documented earlier in this
483, 494 n. 11(1954) (citing seven empirical, including ethnographic
studies, as a partial basis to conclude that there was unjustified racial
discrimination inherent in de jure segregation in the public schools).
Included among the studies was a psychological study in which black
children expressed an apparent preference for looking like white
children. Id. A second study, an opinion survey in which the subjects
were social science investigators, was also cited by the court because
the consensus sentiment of those surveyed was that segregation was
harmful. Id. For source of the name "Brandeis Brief," see Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (naming the appellate brief which
contained the use of empirical evidence drafted by eventual Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis to defend Oregon legislation that limited
the hours women could work). The brief that he filed contained a large
volume of study and statistical data, compiled by others, which
purported to show that in fact excessive work hours were detrimental to
the health of women. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419. The Supreme Court
upheld the statute, and made reference to the data in the brief as a part
of the basis for doing so. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419-23.
220 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 200-01 (1976) (rejecting statistics demonstrating that the arrest of
males between eighteen and twenty for driving while under the
influence substantially exceeded that of females of the same age as an
adequate basis for upholding a statute which prohibited the sale of a
mild form of beer to males but not females of that age). The Court
found that study of additional statistics demonstrated that the gender
differential in arrest rates for driving while under the influence
persisted throughout adulthood. Id. Hence, even if the differential
existed, it was not a rational basis for a differential treatment of only
the youngest age group of males.
221 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comn'n, 540 U.S. 93, 144 (2003)
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article, the Court has employed empirical evidence for both
these purposes, in its recognition and development of the
of the constitutional right to an impartial
components
22
2

jury.

On the other hand, for the better part of the last one
hundred years, the United States Supreme Court has
intermittently and erroneously relied on empirical research
fairly characterized as junk science, rejected reliance on
empirical evidence as a significant component of its basis
for recognizing or expanding several constitutional rights,
and has held legislative enactments rational or irrational by
distorting the relevance, probative value, or reliability of
existing studies, or by ignoring empirical evidence to the
contrary. 223 State supreme courts have also used empirical
(restating the "novelty and plausibility" evaluation standard);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997) (recognizing
that regardless of procedural fairness use to implement certain
enactments, due process prevents infringements on specific rights
protected by the Bill of Rights as well as certain specific components of
liberty, unless narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests).
222 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
223 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 435-36
(2001) (holding that the city could rely on a single study which
attributed crime rate increases to adult book store concentrations, even
though the study lacked any data on the specific issue before the Court,
and the Court failed to make any reference to whether the study
contained base rates, controls, and definitional integrity which would
make it minimally plausible as a basis upon which to make such an
attribution); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding the
mandatory indefinite civil commitment of "sexual predators" despite
express acknowledgement that mandatory constraint by the government
of physical being of a person was at the core of liberty interests that the
state could not violate without offering compelling justification,
including the support of empirical evidence or data, which by definition
means more than just a mere chance of being reality). All the Justices,
without citation to a single empirical study to support their conclusion,
and despite the fact that the Kansas legislature had premised the statute
on a finding that such sexual predators did not suffer from a mental
illness, nevertheless found that the appellee suffered from a "mental
disease," and authorized the possibility that Kansas and other states
could deprive the appellee and those similarly situated of their liberty
for the remainder of their lives. The case is an excellent example of
how there can be multiple discipline decisions to ignore or failure to
develop empirical evidence. This decision characterizing a sexual
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evidence to evaluate alleged violations of state
constitutional rights, and have critically examined the
empirical evidence offered by a state government in
defense of its legislation or legislative classification
scheme.224
predator as mentally ill was based mostly on the fact that the American
Psychiatric Association had included pedophilia, and other sexual antisocial behavior, as a psychiatric disorder despite the absence of
evidence to support finding that such persons suffered from any or
similar physical symptoms, causes, or that there was an actual
treatment protocol. In its amicus brief filed in Hendricks, the APA
argued that lawyers should not necessarily use their categorization of
anti-social behavior as a mental disorder to find that it was such a
disorder or disease for purposes of the legal standard under scrutiny.
Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae for
Leroy Hendricks, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 951649, 95-9075), 1996 WL 469200. See also Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 169-73 (1986) (citing death penalty cases re-qualifying death
penalty jury). In this case, the defendant cited fifteen studies in support
of his contention that the death penalty qualified process resulted in
petite juries which were more likely to determine that the accused was
guilty at the guilt-innocence phase of a trial when the state's system
provided that the same jury would also determine punishment. The
majority found that the plaintiffs claim was one which did not seek to
have studies found relevant or even having probative value, but that the
study results by themselves were the primary basis for satisfying some
unspecified burden of persuasion to establish a per se constitutional
rule. Id. at 171. The Court, without analysis and apparently in conflict
with the apparent subject and nature of many of these studies as well as
the finding of the trial judge, characterized eight of those studies as
only marginally relevant. Id. at 169. This characterization and lack of
evidence of careful evaluation occurred despite the fact that the Court
strongly hinted that it had authority to carefully review and critically
analyze these studies, notwithstanding the lower court finding. Id. at
170. The Court failed to note, comment upon, or integrate or synthesis
the fact that two of the studies it broadly cast as at best only marginally
relevant, were authored by the same core of authors as a study the court
cast as potentially more probative, even though all three were published
in the same volume of the same social science journal. Id.
224 Affronti v. Crosson, 746 N.E.2d 1049, 1052-53 (N.Y. 2001)
(holding that legislative facts can be submitted as evidence to the
state's highest court for the first time on appeal). When offered by the
government to justify the legislation, the court will evaluate the facts
for their accuracy and if they provide a factual basis for finding that the
legislative classification scheme is rational. On the other hand, those
challenging the legislation have the burden to prove there are no facts
to justify the legislation. See also Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors v.
Central State Univ., 699 N.E. 2d 463, 469-70 (Ohio 1998) (determining
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Given the random opportunities these courts have
had to evaluate the validity and significance of empirical
evidence, it is not surprising that their handling of it has
been criticized. Nor is it surprising that they have not
developed an express conceptual scheme (hereafter "a
protocol") for evaluating or a standard for determining
when the quantity and quality of empirical evidence merits
its use as a significant evaluation component of the rational
basis for legislation, or as the basis for recognizing,
expanding, or even devolving a constitutional right.
Such a protocol could be at least under construction if the
state supreme courts kept better track of their prior
evaluations of empirical evidence across doctrines and
Furthermore, they must recognize the
advocates.
implications of decisions such as Daubert for their
that evidence of multiple studies and a data compilation in defense of
legislation that made university professors the only state employees not
able to collectively bargain with regard to workload provided no facts
to support the government's conclusion that workload was causing the
decline in the time university faculty devoted to teaching activities, and
therefore there was no reality basis for the legislation). See also supra
note 208 and accompanying text (discussing what should be the
appropriate review standards employed by state supreme courts in
deciding upon the merit of constitutional challenges to state
legislation).
22' For example, of the hundreds of cases the United States Supreme
Court decided during the period of this study, 1990-2004, the court
only made reference to the terms "rational basis" and "empirical
evidence" or "data" in the same decision fourteen times. See, e.g.,
David N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not So Weisman: The Supreme
Courts Continuous Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279, 281, 295-96 (1995) (criticizing the failure of
the Court to make reference to or explain why it rejected findings in
social science studies which were in conflict with the Court's
sanctioning of state incursions on the liberty of adolescents seeking
abortions). Despite the social science findings, the court agreed with
the reality hypotheses that there was a factual need for such
intervention because there was a difference that mattered in adolescent
decision-making ability. Id. See also Blumenthal, supra note 204, at 6
(noting judicial reluctance to consistently accept the findings of social
science studies, more specifically psychological studies, as the basis for
law reform); Faigman, supra note 202, at 661, 678; Henry F. Fradella,
A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science
"Researcher'sBlackArts," 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 105-06 (2003).
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assessment of empirical evidence when offered by any
party. Law trained statisticians, scientists, and scholars
need to work together to assist these courts by developing
and proposing a protocol that reflects mutually respectful,
226
accurate, precise, discipline-appropriate components.
See discussion supra notes 200-03, 214, 216-18, and accompanying
text (suggesting the elements for a sound protocol). For an article
which urges such mutual respect and makes a series of
recommendations to improve the interplay of the expertise of social
scientists and lawyers in evaluating and improving social policy, see
Blumenthal, supra note 204, at 4-6, 24, 33-35 (providing multiple
examples of failures of both law trained and social science experts to
adequately appreciate the other's doctrines and methodologies). One of
the Blumenthal's core recommendations was more production of metaanalytical studies of existing social science studies with the same or
related null hypotheses by social scientists, and more reliance by
lawyers and judges on quality meta-analysis. Id. at 39-42. In his
article, Blumenthal also recommends more interdisciplinary training,
and more joint studies by social scientists and lawyers to ensure
accurate social science studies and proper use of social science studies
by the legal profession. Id. at 37. However, Blumenthal did not make
express reference to one of the most crucial element of a quality jointly
created protocol that would follow from this line of analysis. A
lawyer's and social scientist's most important collaborative work
should occur at the time the former is fashioning her theory of the case,
and the latter is formulating her null hypotheses. See, e.g., E. Gil Clary
& David R. Schaffer, Effects of Evidence Withholding and a
Defendant's PriorRecord on JuridicDecisions, 112 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
237 (1980). In researching their article, Clary and Schaffer should have
collaborated with a lawyer familiar with criminal procedure and
evidence because their null hypotheses omitted a crucial jury
instruction, admitted an inadmissible juvenile crime record, and
allowed an accused to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
during his trial when, under the circumstances, he had waived the
privilege. Cf Bersoff & Glass, supra note 225, at 289 (suggesting that
law-trained persons recognize that almost all well-done social science
studies have a literature review section carefully examining each
study). Study and evaluation of these literature review sections should
be undertaken to determine if there were prior studies, acknowledged
by the current researchers that made findings contra to the relevant
findings ultimately reported by the current researchers); Faigman,
supra note 202, at 673-78 (recommending that research psychologists
in particular, and social scientists and scientists more generally, remain
faithful to the scientific method and disdain claims that a study or even
a handful of studies can by the basis for a policy change); D.H. Kaye, Is
Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1333,
1342-46 (1986) (recommending that researchers and experts testifying
with regard to whether a null hypotheses was disproved, avoid focus
226
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Absent such an existing protocol, and driven by the
necessity for some guideline to evaluate whether the
empirical evidence identified in this article is sufficient to
prove that conviction records should be banned as evidence
of propensity to lie, this subsection attempts to be faithful
to the protocol construction principles just outlined. This
article next compares the quantity and quality of that
evidence to the quantity and quality of empirical evidence
used expressly or implicitly by courts to decide whether
legislation is rational, whether a specific constitutional right
exists, its dimension if it exists, and whether legislation
which threatens such a right is not only rational, but has
adequate evidentiary support to justify the threat or injury
to a specific constitutional right.
This article has established that no credible
empirical evidence supports the contention that criminal
conviction records are relevant to a prove propensity to lie.
The quantity and quality of empirical evidence presented in
this article to prove that conviction records are irrelevant or
irrational to prove a propensity to lie greatly exceeds or is
of the same magnitude of that relied upon in part by the
United States Supreme Court to conclude that legislation
was rational.227 Moreover, the quantity and quality of
empirical evidence presented in this article to prove that
conviction records are irrelevant or irrational to prove a
propensity to lie, and to establish that the specific
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is
very seriously threatened by such admissions is of a greater
solely on whether a finding(s) was statistically significant, and provide
precise explanations of specific P-value findings). In addition, Kaye
recommended reporting P-values as an incremental scale, conceptually
similar to the evidence law evaluation sliding scale of relevantprobative value-prima facie case.
7 See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 730 (relying in part on four to five statistical studies
establishing the frequency of suicides, and concluding that a large
percentage of suicide victims are suffering from a serious mental illness
at the time they take their lives).
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magnitude than the quantity and quality of statistical
empirical evidence relied upon in part by the United States
Supreme Court to conclude that a legislation classification
was not rational because its premise was not reality, and
therefore unjustifiably threatened to injure the right to an
impartial jury trial.22 8
The quantity and quality of
empirical evidence presented in this article is more than the
quantity and quality of empirical evidence uncritically
relied upon by the United States Supreme Court as a
component of the basis to find an injury to a specific
constitutional right.229
The quantity and quality of
empirical evidence presented in this article to prove that
conviction records are irrelevant as proof of a propensity to
lie, and to establish that the specific constitutional right of
an accused to an impartial jury is very seriously threatened
by such admissions is of a greater magnitude than the
quantity and quality of empirical evidence uncritically
relied upon in part by the United States Supreme Court to
conclude that a legislation classification was not rational
because its premise was not reality, and therefore
perpetuated a racial caste system.2 3 °
Moreover, the
quantity and quality of empirical evidence presented in this
article to prove that conviction records are irrelevant as
proof of a propensity to lie, and to establish that the specific
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is
very seriously threatened by such admissions is of a greater
magnitude than the quantity and quality of empirical
evidence proffered by state governments, but rejected by
228

See supra notes 181-82, 196-98, 209-18 and accompanying text.

Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532 n. 12.
229 See supra notes 181-82, 196-97, 209-18 and accompanying text
(discussing empirical evidence). See also discussion supra note 219.
The Court's uncritical reliance on these studies and failure to
acknowledge empirical studies which had made findings, and based on

those findings, reached ambiguous or conflicting conclusions to those
cited and relied upon by the Court. See Bersoff & Glass, supra note
225, at 286-91.
230 See supra notes 181-82, 196-97, 209-18 and accompanying text.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
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the United States Supreme Court and a state supreme court
as proving a factual, and therefore rational basis which
justified state legislative classification schemes. 231' Finally,
the quantity and quality of empirical evidence presented in
this article to prove that conviction records are irrelevant to
prove a propensity to lie, and to establish that the specific
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is
very seriously threatened by such admissions, is far greater
than the quantity and quality of empirical evidence
uncritically relied upon by the United States Supreme Court
to find that legislation which threatened to injure a specific
constitutional right was rational and arguably trumped the
threatened injury to that right.232
V.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This national study of an important evidence and
criminal justice issue-the existing state rule standards for
the admission of convictions to impeach-has proven that a
wholly random and widely disparate pattern of federalism
can emerge when states' rules regulating the same issue
were adopted and retained, reflecting history more that
policy, even after a recent national opportunity for policy
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1976). See also discussion
supra note 220; discussion supra note 224; Am. Assoc. Univ.
Professors,699 N.E. 2d at 469-70.
232 See supra notes 181-82, 196-97, and 209-18 and accompanying text
(discussing empirical evidence). Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 43536 (relying on single twenty year old study to not only find that the
legislation was rational but that it might be adequate evidence to justify
subordinating first amendment right of a commercial entity). The
Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the data did not even
address the specific multiple purpose adult books combined with video
arcade same cite issue litigated in the case. The Court also reached this
conclusion despite fact that it was willing to project, based on that
research, a cause and effect relationship between multiple,
geographically proximate adult book stores and an increase in crime,
and decline in that area's property values, and without making
reference to whether that study included implementation of or the
nature of "controls."
231
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reflection had occurred. Some federalism outcomes are not
desirable-twenty-eight different standards in the fifty
states with regard to admitting convictions to impeach is
such an undesirable outcome-unless there is at least a
plausible policy reason that can account for this much
diversity. The article identified and evaluated the four
plausible policy reasons for this pattern, and found that they
were either not reality, and if reality, did not explain or
justify this pattern of federalism with respect to admitting
convictions to impeach.
Part I of this article examined the standards of the
federal rule on this issue. In light of this examination and
what has happened to state rules since its adoption, the
federal rule can now be viewed as a national opportunity
lost. 2 33 Only nine states' rules mimic the current federal
standard.234 This article found, however, that as a matter of
policy analysis, the fact that so few states chose to adopt
the federal standards was possibly an appropriate
federalism policy outcome, because the federal rule and its
evolution was as much based on history and mere mimicry
of available enacted standards as it was even the attempt at
sound policy identification, evaluation, and decisionmaking.
Part II presented the primary research and analysis
findings of this article, an identification and ranking of state
evidence rules regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. The conceptual premises of the rankings of each
state's admission of convictions to impeach standard(s)
were explained. 236 The rules of the fifty states were each
evaluated to determine the nature and number of standards
they embodied, their appropriate ranking, and the rankings
were organized into three categories based on whether a
state's standard or standards were overall identical to, more
233

234
235
236

See supra notes 10-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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liberal than, or more restrictive than the three standards of
the federal rule. The most significant overall finding of this
part of the article is that at the end of 2004, nine of every
ten of the fifty states' rules still authorize the possible
admission of records of conviction to impeach most
witnesses, including the accused, which, by element
analysis, cannot satisfy the same states' fundamental
admissions requirement-that the conviction record is
relevant proof of a propensity to lie.237 The second most
significant overall finding of this part of the article is that
even when state rules expressly or implicitly recognize that
conviction records must be relevant to prove a propensity
to lie to be admissible on that issue, almost all of them, like
the federal rule, negate that recognition by failing to define
such limiting concepts as "dishonesty" or "false
statement., 238 Failure to define such terms opens the door
to the possibility of broad interpretations of the termseliminating any rational argument that conviction records
for crimes qualified by these characterizations constitute
logical proof of propensity to lie. 23 9 Blame for this
fundamental failure must be shared by the drafters of the
federal rule, who in the legislative history discussed much
more express and policy based meanings of these concepts,
yet failed to so define the concepts in the federal rule.24 °
Part III of this article began by identifying two
major consequences of twenty-eight different state
legislative standards regulating the issue of admitting
conviction records to impeach. Both of these consequences
most heavily impact members of the legal profession.
First, even evidence experts do not necessary know the
See supra notes 39, 51, 65, 70, 79, 81, 88, 95, 100, 110, 114-115,
123, 127, 130, 133, 138 140, 142, 148-150, 152, 154, 156, 159 and
accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 45, 50, 53, 56, 61, 66, 73, 78, 92, 109, 114, 116,
125, 139, 147, 153, 160 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
237
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current national state of the law on this important issue, and
more importantly, the practicing bar is faced with the
possibility of further variance in these standards by state
supreme courts' interpretations, and the possibility of
hundreds of variants at the trial level.24 ' Part III found that
ultimately these consequences fall most heavily on the
rights, including constitutional rights, of litigants,
particularly the accused in criminal cases, and secondly, all
civil party litigants, particularly individual persons as civil
parties.
Part III reached this ultimate conclusion by next
identifying four possible reasons for twenty-eight state
legislative standards regulating the issue of the admission
of convictions to impeach.243 Once history was dismissed
as an adequate substitute for justice or policy analysis, four
reasons remained that would arguably justify the federal
system's current pattern of twenty-eight state legislative
standards regulating the admission of convictions to
impeach. 244

Part III next evaluated each of these four reasons.
The most significant overall finding of this section is that
none of these reasons were found to be reality, and
therefore, cannot serve as reality-based policy justifications
for this pattern of federalism.

245

An element of this finding

was disproof of the hypothesis that no constitutional rights
are implicated by any or only a few of the current twentyeight state standards, authorizing the admission of
convictions to impeach.246 Injury to the accused's specific
constitutional right to an impartial jury, and the right of the
accused and parties who testify in civil cases to minimal
See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175-91, 199, 219-32 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 168-174 and accompanying text.
244 As Justice Kennedy commented in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at
241

242

572, history and tradition are the starting point but not necessarily
ending point of substantive due process evaluations.
245 See supra notes 175-218 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 170-71 and accompanying text.
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are both threatened by
substantive due process protection,
247
most of the states' standards.
An element of this overall finding was disproof of
the hypothesis that there is empirical or any form of reality
based evidence that a record of criminal conviction is
relevant-i.e., makes it logically more likely-to prove a
propensity to lie.248 No credible evidence supports this
hypothesis, the existing empirical evidence supports the
conclusion that the hypothesized reason is false, and there
is widespread agreement by lawyers and other experts that
a record of conviction is not relevant to prove a propensity
to lie. 249 Admitting irrelevant evidence violates the most
basic evidence admission rule and the most basic
substantive constitutional protection.25 °
An element of this overall finding was disproof of
the hypothesis that most or all of these twenty-eight current
state standards authorizing the admission of convictions to
impeach are consistent with current major evidence trends,
such as the Daubert doctrine. 2 51 The analysis in Part III
concluded that most of these standards are inconsistent with
the call of Daubert and its progeny for critical evaluation
and even re-examination of the basis for admission of
The article argued that Daubert's
expert testimony.
premise that reliance on hunch and heuristics by experts in
other fields, in fairness, should be seen as a general call for
a reality check on the basis of admission of all admission
standards, even those favored by the hunch and heuristics
of the legal community. 252 As such, Daubert's basic
concerns are a subset and supportive of the basic evidence
admissibility requirement of relevance.253 There is more
247
248
249
250

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

175-91,199 and accompanying text.
172 and accompanying text.
193-98 and accompanying text.
191, 199 and accompanying text.

251 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
252
253

See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
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than just the appearance of intellectual hubris on the part of
lawyers and judges participating in drafting and
interpreting evidence rules in continuing to rely on an
unproven historical heuristic, when at the same time
ignoring empirical research supporting conclusions that
conviction records, while irrelevant to prove a propensity to
lie, lead to biased jurors and juries.254
An element of this overall finding was disproof of
the hypothesis that most or all of these twenty-eight current
state standards which do authorize or mandate the
admission of convictions to impeach are consistent with the
reality that there is either no or inadequate empirical
evidence that admitting conviction records ostensibly only
to impeach testimony will result in, or create, a substantial
risk of partial juror(s) and juries. 2 55 Also, in Part III of this
article, multiple empirical studies were identified and their
consistent and consensus findings reported. Those findings
were that jurors and juries are prejudiced in deciding the
merits of cases by misusing conviction evidence for that
purpose, while disdaining use of such conviction records
ostensibly256for its only authorized use as impeachment
evidence.

Finally, the article identified a crucial consequence
of this finding disproving all hypothesized reasons for the
twenty-eight state standards; nine out of every ten state
standards violate or threaten to violate national and state
constitutional rights to substantive due process and the right
of an accused to an impartial jury. 257 Now is the time for
reform.
In 2005, all fifty states and the federal rule should
abolish the admission of conviction records to impeach,
especially where the unfair prejudice that results is likely to
be greatest-when the accused or civil parties take the
See supra notes 204-08
See supra note 174 and
256 See supra notes 209-18
257 See supra notes 219-32
254
255

and accompanying text.
accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
and accompanying text.
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Hence, all references to conviction

records as a basis for impeachment should be eliminated.
Montana has adopted this ban for all witnesses, and that
ban demonstrates that such a ban can be implemented
now. 258 In fairness, enhancing the likelihood of convicting
persons with records, and taking their property in civil
cases, are not adequate counterweights to the admission of
irrelevant evidence that injures these person's constitutional
rights. Nothing in substance will be injured by the ban
when the focus is upon the primary goal of trials-the
search for truth-because jurors will always be skeptical of
the veracity of the accused, civil parties, and any witness
who stands to gain or lose as a result of the outcome of the
trial. 259 Furthermore, when it is appropriate and necessary,
i.e., when a witness refuses to admit that he has previously
lied under oath, and there is a judicial determination that he
has so lied, the trial judge can instruct the jury of the fact
that the person has previously lied under oath. There is
never a justification for reference to a record of criminal
conviction, and such a conviction record need not be the
only basis for a judicial determination that the witness has
previously lied under oath.260 Federalism is one of the
258 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. See also supra notes
44, 52, 102 (discussing the fact that Hawaii, Kansas, and Georgia all
ban the offensive introduction of any conviction to impeach the
accused). All states should immediately abandon qualifying which
convictions can be admitted to impeach on the ground that the crime
charged was punishable by more than one year in jail. States should
also immediately abandon which qualifying convictions can be
admitted to impeach by reference to common law concepts such as
"moral turpitude" or any generic and undefined concepts such as
crimes of "dishonesty" or "false statement." These common law and
generic concepts open the door to potential distortion to accomplish an
goal.
admission
259
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
260 Pre-trial notice and a pre-trial hearing provide a procedural avenue

for proving a previously unadjudicated lie under oath. Eliminating any
reference to a record of criminal conviction means that the new national
standard becomes simply a very limited procedural exception to FED.
R. EVID. 608 and comparable state rules, which allow questioning but
not extrinsic evidence to prove specific incidents of behavior relevant
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greatest strengths of our system; it is not, however, an
excuse for ignoring our most basic constitutional and
evidentiary policies.

to prove propensity to lie.
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